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The thesis examines the Nordic Nuclear Weapon Free Zone
(NWFZ) proposal and its ramifications for the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), the United States and the West. The central
theme running through each Soviet proposal has been the removal of
the American nuclear guarantee. Preservation of US national
security interests and hence US ability to extend its forward
defense would be gravely threatened by a Nordic NWFZ. A Nordic
NWFZ would be detrimental to US, NATO and Nordic national security
interests. However, unilateral agreenent on a NWFZ is not likely
by the anticipated members of the Nordic NWFZ (United States,
Soviet Union, Denmark, Norway, Finland, Iceland, Greenland and
Sweden.) The United States has military installations in Iceland
and Greenland and the banning of nuclear weaponry during wartime
is inconceivable. The question then arises as to which nation or
groups of nations will dominate and which will acquiesce.
Inevitably the debate breaks down to a "tug of war" between the two
superpowers. It is not the nuclear weaponry but the politics
surrounding the weaponry that is the heart of the nuclear free zone
debate. By leaving out politics, one is ignoring the true sources
of conflict and instability. Changing world politics demand that
the West develop a unified strategy toward the Soviet Union and its
initiatives. Through NATO it must preserve its vital economic,
political and military objectives in the Northern Flank. Flexible
naval forces and strong political and economic ties to the
iv
governments of the nations bordering the Baltic are essential.
Strong NATO naval forces operating in the waters of the Baltic must
be seen as guarantors of the West's strategic aims and interests.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Soviet attempts to influence the Nordic NATO nations to
designate the Nordic region a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ) are
part of a campaign to weaken the Alliance. The motivations driving
the Soviet Union's promotion of a Nordic NWFZ constitute a
continuation of war through peaceful measures.
Ironically, the Scandinavian nations are already nuclear-free
and the establishment by treaty of a Nordic NWFZ would in fact be
a de jure recognition of Scandinavia's status; a promise of the
continuation of the nuclear free status. The Soviets are seeking
a promise of the continuance of the nuclear free status in the
future. NWFZs are not new to the Kremlin. Gorbachev is not the
first Soviet leader to propose the designation of the Nordic area
as a NWFZ. The primary theme running through each Soviet proposal
has been the removal of the American nuclear guarantee. US
national security interests and the US ability to extend guarantees
to allies would be gravely threatened by a Nordic NWFZ.
A NWFZ would supposedly ensure that the territory in question
is entirely free of nuclear weapons. The Participating states
would refrain from the manufacture, acquisition, control, transit,
stationinq, and storage of such weapons. The Soviet
Union considers itself exempt from such restrictions. "No part of
the Soviet Union could become part of a Nordic nuclear-free zone,
not even the Baltic..." As both a nuclear power that is
also a superpower, the Soviet Union considers its territory exempt
from nuclear weapon restrictions. It can be argued that the
Kremlin considers nuclear weapons as necessary for the
continuance if its superpower status,
"Therefore neither can its (Soviet) territory nor any part
thereof be included in a nuclear-weapon-free zone or in a
so-called 'security belt' adjacent to the nuclear-free zone;
nor can the stipulations of the nuclear-free zone be an
obstacle to navigation by Soviet vessels in the straits of 2the
Baltic Sea, regardless of the type of weapons they carry."
This logic however does not carry through for the "other
superpower". US nuclear capabilities would be prohibited from a
Nordic NWFZ. Without the American nuclear guarantee, Western
European allies would not be able to withstand a Soviet-led
attack. "The strategic protection of Europe is as strong or as
weak as the American strategic guarantee, no matter what American
weapons are deployed under NATO."
3
Nordic NWFZ proposals are receiving increased attention and
will continue to do so in the future. Nuclear disarmament by the
year 2000 is the goal that Chairman Gorbachev has set for the
world. "The Soviet Union proposes that z step-by-step,
iErling Bjol, "Nordic Security" Adelphi Papers Number 181
(London: The International Institute For Strategic Studies, 1983),
p. 28.
2 1bid.
3McGeorge Bundy, "Strategic Deterrence Thirty Years Later -
What Has Changed?", International Institute For Strategic Studies,
Twenty-First Annual Conference on The Future of Strategic
Deterrence, Plenary Session, 6 September 1979, p.7.
2
consistent process of ridding the earth of nuclear weapons be
implemented and completed within the next 15 years, before the end
of the century. ''4 The Soviets propose the "complete
elimination of medium-rancle missiles of the USSR and the USA in
the European zone - both ballistic and cruise missiles - as a first
step towards ridding the European continent of nuclear
weapons.
,,5
Soviet statements make it clear that the Soviet Union is
sincere in the goal of nuclear disarmament foz e'-ry other
nation, particularly the nations which form the perimeter of the
Soviet Union. 6 "Aggregated on a map, they virtually encircle the
Soviet Union providing a defense buffer."'7  When it comes to
nuclear disarmament for the Soviet Union, that is another matter
all together. As in all Soviet pledges one must examine the
actions behind the statements. Soviet actions do not support
claims for Soviet compliance with nuclear disarmament in
Scandinavia. If the Soviet Union cannot come to g-ips with nuclear
4
"Nuclear Disarmament By The Year 2000" Statement by Mikhail
Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, The
New York Times, February 5, 1986, p. A13.
5
"Nuclear Disarmament By The Year 2000" p. A13.
61t is interesting to note that when one links the regions
that the Soviet Union would like to see designated as NWFZs, these
regions encircle the Soviet Union. Moscow believes that peripheral
security of the Soviet Union must be maintained as without this
security, the Soviets are vulnerable. But the Soviets also realize
that the maintenance of peripheral security represents the weakest
link in their chain of security measures.
7james J. Tritter., Naval Arms Control: An Idea Whose TIme
Has Yet To Come NPS-56-80-015, August 1989, p. 9-
3
disarmament in a small region such as Scandinavia, it is doubtful
if the Kremlin could conform to nuclear disarmament elsewhere.
The "common European home" theme prevalent in contemporary
Soviet rhetoric reminds one of the Soviet "inner seas strategy".
The "inner seas strategy" deals with the Baltic region. Moscow
would like to see the region designated as a closed seas open only
to the littoral nations of the region. This same logic can be
applied to the So iet perception of a Nordic NWFZ - a zone closed
to "outsiders" but open to the Soviets. The American military
would be ousted. Gorbachev seeks the elimination of the American
military presence in Europe. The Soviet Union has long been trying
to oust the United States from Europe. What is new is Gorbachev
and his astute diplomatic skills. The new dimension in Soviet
politics will not allow the Soviet Union to be weighed in terms
defined by the United States.
The Nordic NWFZ proposal provides a very attractive platform
for Gorbachev to exercise his diplomatic and maneuvering skills.
The Nordic region outside the Soviet Union is politically stable
and cohesive and does not have nuclear weapons on its soil. Moscow
seeks to ban the US nuclear presence in the North and subsequently
to drLve a wedge between the United States and its Northern allies.
The U'-ted States has historically demilitarized following
each war. Now that the Cold War is professed tj be over. the
United States anpears to be on the verge of another
demilitarization. Budget cuts and public opinion complicate US
resolve to remain in Europe. This will inevitably effect the
4
proposed Nordic NWFZ and could alter its structure for the United
States, NATO and the USSR.
"The Nordic NWFZ is a good example of a proposal that has been
under consideration for many years but still faces strong obstacles
to its coming into being."'8 It is not the nuclear weaponry but the
politics surrounding the weaponry that is the heart of the nuclear
free zone debate. By leaving out politics, one is ignoring the
true sources of conflict and instability. Definition, geographic
scope, negative security guarantees, verification and compliance
only complicate not clarify the issue of NWFZs. The idea of NWFZ
in general is self-defeating. Unilateral agreement on any of these
issues is not likely by the anticipated members of the Nordic NWFZ
(United States, Soviet Union, Denmark, Norway, Finland, Iceland and
Greenland.) The United States has military installations in
Iceland and Greenland and the banning of nuclear weaponry during
wartime is inconceivable. The question then arises as to which
nation or nations will dominate and which will acquiesce.
Inevitably the debate breaks down to a "tug of war" between the two
superpowers. Changing world politics demand that the West develop
a unified strategy toward the Soviet Union and its initiatives.
"The US generally takes the position that it cannot and will not
negotiate Allied nuclear forces while the Soviet Union views all
8Ronald G. Purver "Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones And The Nordic
NWFZ Proposal" Arctic Arms Control: Constraints And Opportunities,
Occasional Paper Number 3, Canadian Institute for International
Peace and Security, February 1988, p. 11.
5
weapons that are capable of hitting its homeland as 'strategic."''9
The United States must not back down from this position for "...the
Soviet Union necessarily relies to a critical degree on its Arctic
territories for the basing of the most secure element of its
nuclear retaliatory force, its ballistic missile submarines. It
would be in the interests of neither the Soviet Union nor the West
to compromise the relative invulnerability of these forces by the
application of arbitrary geographic restrictions."'1 0
9james J. Tritten Naval Arms Control: An Idea Whose Time Has




A Nordic NWFZ equates to a geographic "stand off zone 'll of
American nuclear weaponry. This is not acceptable. Nations cannot
be partitioned into "stand off zones" of any sort particularly if
it is done to enhance another nation's military and political
objectives. "Washington expressly opposes the creation of a Nordic
nuclear-free zone, on the basis that it would (1) complicate arms
control in Europe, (2) harm alliance cohesion and cooperations, (3)
severely restrict NATO's policy of flexible response in northern
Europe, and (4) not take into full account Soviet nuclear weapons
in the area." Consideration of the long-term effects of a Nordic
NWFZ is foremost. A Nordic NWFZ does not conform to the ideals of
Western Security either in the short-term or the long-term.
The current popularity of the Soviet Union coupled with the
recent events in Eastern Europe encourage those not well-versed in
Sovietology to believe that the Kremlin has "reformed" and that
dentocracy is the inevitable outcome for the Soviet Union.
Associated with this rationale is the naive assumption that now is
the time to unite with the Soviet Union and disarm. This thinking
is very dangerous. The United States must not and cannot think
that the Soviet Union has altered its goal of world domination.
Its tactics may be new but its objective has not wavered.
llIbid.,p. 9.
7
Gorbachev is wholly committed to the communist goal of world
domination and the United States and the West is playing into his
hands. In 1937, Gorbachev stated in his senior thesis,
'War to the hilt between communism and capitalism is
inevitable. Today, of course, we are not strong enough to
attack. Our time will come in thirty to forty years. To win,
we shall need the element of surprise. The Western world will
have to be put to sleep. So we (the Soviet Union) shall begin
by launching the most spectacular peace movement on record.
There shall be electrifying overtures and unheard of
concessions. The capitalist countries, stupid and decadent,
will rejoice to cooperate to their own destruction. They will
leap at another chance to be friends. As soon as their luard
is down, we shall smash them with our clenched fists. 1
A Nordic NWFZ is just another Soviet bid at Western manipulation.
The groundwork has been laid and in light of the recent events in
the communist world, one can easily see that the above forecast is
uncomfortably closer to reality. Moscow is very willing to "wait
it out" for ". ..the Soviet leadership seems content to play a
waiting game, using considerable experience and expertise in the
field of subversion to erode rival influences... and promote the
emergence of governments likely to be complaisant or even act as
surrogates. In fact, the best of both worlds from the Soviet point
of view, would be to achieve the fruits of successful military
enterprise without having undertaken the risks."'1 3
12 Dimitry Manullski, Professor at the Lenin School of
Political Warfare in Moscow, 1930 as quoted by Mikhail Gorbachev
in his senior class thesis circa 1937.
1 3W.T. Roy "The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone and Regional
Security (With Special reference to Sea Lanes of Communication)"
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute, Volume 15, Number 3,
August 1989, pp. 34-35.
8
A Nordic NWFZ would gravely diminish ,iATO. The adoption of
a NWFZ by a portion of NATO would greatly undermine the flexible
response of the Alliance. "It is precisely because of a heavy
investment in military strength that Europe enjoys considerable
stability in security terms today; and it is clear that unilateral
reduction of the Western military presence would undermine that
stability. ',1 4 NATO's flexible response doctrine is based on the
requirement of maintaining adequate conventional and nuclear
forces, at force levels adequate to deter Soviet aggression. The
support of the Nordic nations is an absolute prerequisite.
Gorbachev's most recent proposal for a NWFZ reflects long-
standing interests in controlling the region. Johan Jorgen Holst
labels the NWFZ as ". ..primarily an instrument designed to
influence the nature of peacetime relations.",1 5 The proposal has
met with much opposition and skepticism in the West. Danish
Defence Minister Bernt Johan Collet rejected the Soviet Union's
proposal and stated that this would 'damage the North Atlantic
bloc'. 1 6  Moscow counters such reservations as echoing the
Pentagon's non-acceptance of the creation of a Nordic nuclear-free
zone and the continuance of the US build up of military activity
1 4 Christoph Bertram, "Europe's Security Dilemmas" Foreign
Affairs, Summer 1987, p. 945.
1 5 Johan Jorgen Holst, "Norwegian Security Policy: The Domestic
Context" in Geoffrey Till, ed., Britain and NATO's Northern Flank
(London: Macmillan, 1988)
1 6
"Danish Minister's Rejection of Proposals Viewed" LD212034
TASS 21 Jan 88, FBIS-SOV-88-014, 22 Jan 88, pp. 29-30.
9
in the region.1 7 Evident is the distrust in Soviet policies and
shared Nordic sentiment that the destruction of intermediate- and
shorter-range missiles will have a detrimental effect on the world
situation. 1 8 Despite official opposition to the zone by Nordic
leaders, Moscow contends that a Nordic NWFZ is "in the interest of
the peoples of northern Europe as the absolute majority of people
in Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Norway, Iceland declare for the easing
of tension, for a nuclear weapons-free north, for broad cooperation
of all concerned countries in the region."'1 9 But is it? This is
a much too simplistic interpretation of Nordic debates regarding
the establishment of a Nordic nuclear-free zone.
A general attitude toward national security in Soviet NWFZ
proposals has emerged. "The consolidation of international
security also has a domestic political angle for the restructuring
cause in the USSR and other socialist countries."'2 0 The Kremlin
seeks the accomplishment of its foreign policy goals through more
assertive political means; means less expensive than military
means, particularly at a time when all available resources
necessary to rebuild the Soviet Union domestically must be
1 7 Ibid.
1 8
"Military-PoliticalSituation in N. Europe Viewed" LD091758
Moscow International Service in Finnish 7 Feb 88 FBIS-SOV-88-027
10 Feb 1988, p. 45.
1 9 Ibid.
2 0
"Pact Military Doctrine Aims To Prevent War" AU2609172188
Moscow Kommunist in Russian No 13, Sep 88 (Signed to Press 25 Aug
88) pp. 110-119 - For Official Use Only, FBIS-SOV-88-190, 30
September 1988, p. 4.
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channeled in different directions. Cited are "...the need to
consolidate any trends that promote international security, on the
one hand, and the shift of emphasis to political means of ensuring
national security, on the other..."2l"The primary implications of
these fundamental changes for Soviet national security policies are
increased subordination of foreign policy to domestic priorities
and the necessity to reduce investments in the defense sector... a
new Soviet strategy is emerging that calls for arms control
agreements to reduce the Western threat and thereby allow Gorbachev
to cut Soviet defense expenditures with minimal adverse effect on
Soviet military advantages."
2 2
Complicating the issue of NWFZs is the overall issue of arms
control. Arms control has conformed to the changing global
environment and William Van Cleave states that,
"Arms control is now almost purely political. The strategic
standards for evaluating it and the very meaning of the term
itself have become obscured. Politically, arms control has
become a normative, rather than a descriptive, term. Like
disarmament, it apparently has become an end in itself, rather
than a means to national security ends. '
The Soviet Union and the United States have very different
expectations for arms control. This difference in expectations
stems from the inequitable concentration of armed forces held by
the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO). "In the years of intensive
2 1 Ibid.,p. 5.
2 2 Ibid.,p. 21.
2 3William R. Van Cleave, "The Arms Control Record: Successes
And Failures" in Richard F. Staar, ed., Arms Control Myth Versus
Reality, (Stanford, Ca.: Hoover Institution Press, 1984), p. 20.
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buildup in the military might of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact a
by no means symmetrical picture of the state of armed forces and
arms has emerged in the West and East Europe." 2 4 This asymmetry is
a direct correlation of the way in which the superpowers view arms
control. "The Soviets stress that military factors have to be seen
in an essentially politically context. They feel that political
reasons, notably arms negotiations, can both make the maintenance
of military power less costly and help to bring about appropriate
changes in the international system.,,25
"The principal US aim in (strategic nuclear) arms control has
always been to improve the survivability of deterrent forces and
to lessen Soviet incentives for a surprise or pre-emptive attack."
2 6
Rear Admiral William 0. Studeman, US Navy, Director of Naval
Intelligence stated that,
"The Soviet Union under Gorbachev is also paying increased
attention to international proposals for naval arms controls
and constraints on naval operations... (such as) restricting
naval activity in the Baltic, North, Norwegian, and Greenland
Seas, including special limitations on ASW weapons, prior
2 4
"European Arms Control Prospects Viewed" PM03310152388
Moscow Izvestiva in Russian, 2 Oct 88, Morning Edition pp. 4-5,
FBIS-SOV-88-192, 4 October 1988, p. 1.
2 5Gerhard Wettig, "'New Thinking' on Security and East-West
Relations" Problems of Communism, March-April 1988, p. 3.
2 6William R. Van Cleave, "The Arms Control Record", Arms
Control Myth Versus Reality, Richard F. Staar, ed., (Stanford, Ca.:
Hoover Institution Press, 1984), p. 18.
12
notification of major naval exe,ises, and the presence of
observers at such activities...'
One could then conclude that US goals in arms control in which the
curtailment of naval activities is sought by the Soviet Union would
be the insurance if not continued enhancement of US and NATO naval
activity in the proposed region. In this aspect arms control can
be considered a political instrument. It encourages cohesiveness
as well as shared perceptions which lead to shared responsibility
for the defense of the region by the United States and its allies.
This requires political finesse.
A Nordic NWFZ proposal is both a political instrument aimed
at reducing regional tension and a military instrument designed to
reduce the flexibility of NATO. As a political instrument, a
Nordic NWFZ conforms to the Soviet policy of reasonable
sufficiency. Moscow is attempting to establish a Nordic NWFZ
through political measures, thereby reducing the military
significance of such a zone. The "party line" accentuates the
political problems of security but does not diminish the military
aspects of security.
"The basic premise of the concept is that security is
primarily a political problem. In our time reasonable
security of a country can be ensured only through a strategy
representing an integral rational combination of the
political, military, economic, ideological, humanitarian and
other factors involved. The dominant role in this complex is
played by political factors. There alone we can find the
rational answer to the challenge presented to the security of
the nations. In the political sphere the key to the solution
2 7 Statement of Rear Admiral William 0. Studeman, U.S. Navy,
Director of Naval Intelligence Before the Seapower and Strategic
and Critical Materials Subcommittee of the House Armed Services
Committee on Intelligence Issues, 1 March 1988, pp. 24-25.
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of the central problem of the security of each state
separately and all of them taken together to the limitation
and reduction of armaments can be found."128
(Emphasis added)
As a political instrument, a Nordic NWFZ is viewed as a
Confidence Building Measure (CBM) or tension reduction technique.
This appeals to nations such as Sweden which regard confidence
building measures, particularly those involving the Barents Sea,
as important not only on a bilateral basis between the superpowers,
as is implied by the Soviet proposal, but on a broader,
multilateral basis either through the United Nations or within the
framew zk of the all-European process. 2 9 Sverre Lodgaard and Marek
Thee in their work Nuclear Disengagement in Europe contend that,
"In northern and southern Europe, NWFZs would primarily be
confidence-building measures (CBMs). They would have some
military significance, but greater political importance. In
time of crisis, they would function as early-warning systems
-in the political rather than in the military
sense... Generally, the zone arrangements should enhance
stability and improve the conditions for crisis management,
thereby strengthening the security of the member states and
reducing tension between the maAr powers in two strategically
important areas of the globe."
Richard Bitzinger states that,
S... a Nordic NWFZ would make an important contribution to
international security, especially for the rest of Europe.
The creation in Northern Europe of a NWFZ, by confirming the
2 8
"Academics Discuss 'Reasonaole Sufficiency'" PM130735 Moscow
New Times in English No. 40, 12 Oct 87, pp.13-15. FBIS-SOV-87-
1987, 14 October 1987, p. 4.
2 9
"Sweden's Schori Briefs Press on Security Issues" PM291627
Izvestiya 29 Jan 88, FBIS-SOV-88-019, 29 Jan 88, pp. 31 -32.
3 0Sverre Lodgaard and Marek Thee, Nuclear Disengagement in
Europe (London: Taylor & Francis, Ltd., 1983), p. 6.
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region as an area of low tension and stability, would hav~la
positive effect on security in the rest of the continent." 1
But would it? Within the interpretation of a Nordic NWFZ as a
military instrument is the idea that such a zone would reduce the
possibility of horizontal escalation. Horizontal escalation is
defined as "...the idea that armed conflicts in one region can be
escalated by opening new fronts elsewhere, at a significant
distance from the original war theatre." 3 2  Europe is still
considered the primary focus of the Soviets, but the 'Europe
first'3 3 rationale does not preclude horizontal escalation by the
United States in the Pacific or elsewhere in the world. ". ..Zone
arrangements could make Europe less sensitive to conflicts
elsewhere and reduce the risk of a nuclear holocaust by horizontal
escalation to Europe.
'3 4
Factors motivating the Kremlin in the pursuance of a Nordic
NWFZ are not complicated. Ridding Western Europe of the American
nuclear guarantee is paramount. The break up of NATO is also a
goal. These two goals lay the framework for the goal of dividing
America and her allies in Europe. As stated earlier, NWFZ
proposals are not new to the Kremlin or unique to Northern Europe.
3 1Richard Bitzinger, "Nordic Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zones:
Prospects and Problems" Rand P-7356, August 1987, p. 9.
3 2 Lodgaard and Thee, pp. 5 - 6.
3 3 Prasert Chittiwatanapong "Japan's role in the Asia-Pacific
Region" Korea and World Affairs, p. 568.
3 4 Lodgaard and Thee, p. 6.
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Gorbachev seeks a NWFZ for the Indian Ocean 3 5 and the expansion of
South Pacific NWFZ 3 6 as well.
"The overriding issue for Western Europe has been whether the
United States has safeguarded its ability to extend deterrence
guarantees to allies, or whether it might be tempted to neglect
allied interests in pursuing a selfishly bilateral settlement with
the Soviet Union."'3 7 Nowhere is collective security more tangible
or more important than in Western Europe. Former United States
Secretary of Defense, Frank Carlucci states that,
"Maintaining defense adequate to insure our collective
security is well within our economic means - and our
allies' as well Whether we do so or not is a matter of
political will." (Emphasis added)
The United States and its Allies have an obligation to maintain
the political will Mr. Carlucci speaks of. Establishment of a
Nordic NWFZ could greatly complicate Western resolve.
The Nordic naticns have a history of political stability and
cohesiveness. Nordic cohesiveness has already been disrupted by
3 5
"Gorbachev Offers New Bids on Asian Policy" The Current
Digest Of The Soviet Press, Volume XL, No. 38, October 19, 1988,
p. 6.
3 6Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Delivered at
the Presentation of the Order of Lenin, Vladivostok, USSR, July 28,
1986, "International Affairs: Asia and the Pacific Region" Vital
Speeches of the Day, September 15, 1986, p. 711.
37 David Yost, "Soviet Arms Control Policy in Europe,"
unpublished essay, p. 19.
3 8 Frank C. Carlucci, Former United States Secretary of Defense
"America's Alliance Structure: The New Isolationism", Delivered at
the Foreign Policy Association, New York, New York, May 5, 1988,
Vital Speeches of the Day, June 1, 1988, p. 484.
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the Soviet superiority within the region. Further Soviet influence
by the Soviet Union would only drive the Nordic region further from
the West and closer militarily and politically towards the Soviet
Union. "...History shows that when a state accumulates too much
military power in the region, the entire structure of northern
European security begins to break down."'3 9 The Soviet Union seeks
economic, military and political dominance of not just Northern
Europe but all of Europe. The Soviet proposal for a Nordic NWFZ
represents a major step in the fulfillment of the Soviet desire to
control the Nordic region, and deprive the West of its influence
and control in the region. When viewed in basic terms, the Soviet
proposal for a Nordic NWFZ equates to a superpower struggle, with
Nordic security as the prize.
39 Paul M. Cole, "The Northern Balance Changing Realities in
Defending North2rn Europe" Defen - & Foreign Affairs, December
1936, p. 21.
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III. GENERAL DISCUSSION OF ARMS CONTROL
Today the world is no longer a bipolar world but a multipolar
world with five nations -n possession of nuclear weapons and many
more developing nuclear weapon capability. Further complicating
the nuclear weapon issue is the fear that nuclear weapons could be
used by sub-national groups such as teriorists against nations or
other sub-national organizations. No longer does one have to fear
nuclear threats or accidental usp from only the superpowers. The
diversity of nuclear warfare and the ease at which a nation or
agency can develop or obtain nuclear weaponry has provided the
impetus to keep areas free from nuclear weapons. It is believed
that such regions are less likely to promote nuclear conflict. Is
a NWFZ a viable option? Would the establishment of NWFZs benefit
the United States or Soviet Union national security or degrade- the
national security interests of the nations and as a result the East
and the West? As stated in Chapter 2, the United States has
expressly opposed the Nordic NWFZ proposal reasoning that it would
damage NATO cooperation. Would the establishment of NWFZs such as
the Nordic NWFZ proposed for the North Atlantic signal a return to
the bipolarity of the Cold War? The Soviet Union has long
advocated the establishment of NWFZs in Europe but contends that
the zories were never achieved for the West saw NWFZs as a breach
of its political power.
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"The idea of nonnuclear territories on the European continent
has its history. Back in 1956 the Soviet Union proposed to
create such a zone in Central Europe, in 1959 it proposed one
in the Balkans, and in 1963 it proposed to declare the entire
region of the Mediterranean a zone free of nuclear weapons.
But each time these plans remained unrealized by virtue of the
negative position of NATO countries, and the United Sta~s
above all, saw them as a threat to their power politics."
NWFZs are no less of a threat to Western European and hence NATO
security today. The basic strategic problem, set in a global
context, facing the United States and its NATO allies today and
tomorrow is the power to sustain the means to provide a forward
defense in Europe while being able to project power to other
regions of vital importance. Henry Kissinger in his article "The
Future of NATO" states that,
"I believe that the defense of Europe and of the United States
is indissoluble. I believe that the United States must
guarantee the defense of Europe. But I believe that both
Europe and the United States have a joint interest in
developing a defense doctrine that our (US) leaders can
explain to our publics over a extended period of time.
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The American nuclear guarantee is integral to the defense guarantee
of which Kissinger speaks. For the past forty years NATO has
maintained a nuclear emphasis within its defensive
shield via the American nuclear guarantee for many reasons, one
being that NATO refuses to pay the price for substitutes.
4 0
"Nonnuclear Zones: Important Factor of European Security"
18010401B Moscow Zarubezhnoye Vovennove Obozreniye in Russian No
5, May 88 (signed to press 5 May 88 ) pp. 9-12, JPRS-UFM-88-011,
31 October 1988, p. 5.
4 1Henry Kissinger, "The Future of NATO," The Washington
Quarterly, vol. 2., no.4 (Autumn, 1979) p. 13.
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The Soviet Union wants a Western Europe kept intact in the
event of NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict. Sovietologists anticipate that
the established agricultural, business, and industrial complexes
already in place will be utilized to rebuild the Soviet empire
which, should the Soviet Union be victorious, would include Western
Europe. Dean Acheson, US Secretary of State, stated in 1949 that,
"They (the Soviets) need and want the people, industry and
resources of Western Europe. They do not want to destroy
them. Success in the cold war a(nieves this. The hot war
may lose all this and more too... the loss of Western Europe
or of important parts of Asia or the Middle East would be a
transfer of potential from West to East, which, depending on
the MYa, might have the gravest consequences in the long
run."
Acheson's observation is just as true today.
It can be argued that the Kremlin considers nuclear weapons
as necessary for the continuance of its superpower status.
Superpower status of a country is measured in terms of military,
political and economic might. "A country's security still cannot
be ensured by political means alone, without armed forces that have
been appropriately trained and equipped, is an indisputable
truth.",4 3 A nation's military might is based upon the size of a
country's arsenal, combat forces and the capability of the nation's
4 2 Dean Acheson, Memorandum by the Secretary of State,
Washington, December 20, 1949, Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1949. Volume I, National Security Affairs, Foreign Economic
Policy, (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing
Office, 1976), p. 615.
43"A Call to De-Emphasize Military Strength" The Current
Digest Of The Soviet Press, Volume XL, No. 46, December 14, 1988,
p. 1.
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weapon systems. The calculation incorporates both conventional and
nuclear forces. Arms control agreements are used by nations to:
1. limit the destructive potential of one or another nation's
conventional and nuclear forces,
2. reduce risks of war,
3. or reduce costs.
"It appears that the Soviet Union views arms control less as
a tool for achieving genuine stability and balance, and much more
as a political tool for securing advantages either through actual
agreements or through politics of the negotiating process itself."
4 4
It would appear that the Soviets are only serious about arms
control as it benefits their objectives. This is no different from
US intentions, but the Soviet Union seems to be more astute in
negotiating its position in arms control than is the United States.
"The Soviet Union is not about to abdicate its superpower status,
its military capabilities will remain a threat to those who do not
trust its declarations of friendly intent."'4 5 One can then conclude
that Arms Control is a Zero Sum Game, not a non-Zero Sum Game.
"Although it is extremely fashionable in the US and the West to
think of arms control in terms of a 'non-zero sum game,' in which
one side does not gain advantage over the other, arrz control as
4 4 Charles A. Sorrels, Soviet propaganda campaign against NATO
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, October 1983, p. 34.
4 5 Christoph Bertram "Europe's Security Dilemmas" Foreign
Affairs Summer 1987, p. 957.
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a part of an overall national security strategy properly places it
in the 'zero sum game camp.'"
4 6
The West is very often guilty of mirror-imaging when
interpreting Soviet initiatives and underlying motives. This is
very dangerous for,
"There is little doubt that the Soviet leadership wants a
different arms control and for different reasons than does
the present (Reagan) US administration. Ironically, sormetimes
the use of the same terminology obscures the gap: strategic
stability, for instance, is emphasized by both si9es, but it
carries profoundly different meaning- for each."
The United States no longer can assume that the Soviet Union views
arms control or any cther issue involving superpower competition
in the same light as the United States. For example, the Soviet
Union does not recognize the US definition of detente. Thc United
States views the subject of detente as a whole whereas Moscow
differentiates between political and military detente with
political detente in support of and subordinate to military
detente. Furthermore, political detente is subordinate to military
detente, in Soviet eyes, only to the point that it enhances
military detente. 4 8 "Continuing a persistent struggle for detente
and prevention of war, the Soviet Union is doing everything
necessary to strengthen the country's military might, to improve
4 6James J. Tritten, Naval Arms Control: An Idea Whose Time
Has Yet To Come, p. 21.
4 7 Dimitri K. Simes, "Are the Soviets Interested in Arms
Control" The Washington Quarterly Spring 1985, p. 147.
4 8 political Terms: A Short Guide (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency
Publishing House, 1982) pp. 21-22.
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the Soviet Armed Forces and to raise their combat capability and
combat readiness in every possible way. :49No longer can the United
States reassure itself with claims that the Soviet Union and the
United States foster similar objectives.
"The United States cainot expect the USSR to promote U3
national security interest through arms control agreements.
The Soviets will surrender no advantage, and the United States
has not the leverage to force them to do so. Experience shows
that the United States is more like4 to be constrained than
helped by the negotiating process."
One quickly questions the sensibility of negotiating with the
Soviets, particularly the issue of arms control. The Soviet Union
has repeatedly violated previous treaty agreements with the
construction of the Krasnoyarsk large phased-array radar (LPAR)
facility being one of the most recent and most flagrant violations.
It is a violation of the ABM Treaty 5 1 , a treaty that one would
expect to be respected in anticipation of a meaningful NWFZ debate
with the United States. "Symbolic arms control is, after all,
always feasible, even if substantial arms control has proved
4 9
"The Evolution of Military Art: Stages, Tendencies,
Principles" JPRS-UMA-89-012-L, 12 October 1989, p. 1.
5 0 William Van Cleave, "Arms Control Record" in Arms Control
Myth Versus Reality, p. 19.
5 1The Krasnoyarsk LPAR clearly violates the ABM Treaty because
of its location and orientation. Even though the Soviet military
has turned the radar station over to the USSR Academy of Military
Sciences, the United States still contends that the Krasnoyarsk
LPAR, because of its capability to function as a ballistic missile
detection and radar, is a violation of the ABM Treaty. Said
violation can only be corrected by the dismantling cf the radar.
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historically largely impossible." 52 Is a NWFZ at best a symbolic
arms control maneuver?
"The enduring effectiveness of the American guarantee has not
depended on strategic superiority. It has depended instead
on two great facts: the visible deployment of major American
military forces in Europe, and the very evident risk that any
large-scale engagement between the Soviet and American forces
would rapidly and unconpfoil-ably (sic) become general,
nuclear, and disastrous."
However, there is no guarantee that the Soviet nuclear deterrent
would be diminished.
The basic criterion for negotiating with the Soviet Union
should be the enhancement of US national security interests. In
the case of the Nordic NWFZ proposal, not only is the national
security interest of the United States at stake but that of its
Scandinavian allies as well. By extension the security of Western
Europe could be threatened for the security of Western
Europe is enmeshed in the forward deployment strategy of the United
States in the North.
A. OVERVIEW OF OTHER NWFZ PROPOSALS
Valuable insight can be provided by the Latin American NWFZ
established by the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the South Pacific
Nuclear Free Zone (SPNFZ). Concentration will be upon these two
zones as similarities with the Nordic NWFZ are easily established.
The Treaty of Tlatelolco established a Latin American NWFZ in a
region that did not yet have nuclear weapons and elicited a promise
5 2Ranger, p. 57.
5 3 Bundy, pp. 7-8.
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from both superpowers not to introduce nuclear weapons into the
region. Do the Soviets have another Treaty of Tlatelolco in mind
for the Nordic nations of NATO?
Both the South Pacific and the Baltic are labelled as "closed
seas" for one of the superpowers (The South Pacific has "all the
characteristics of being an American lake, although that power's
influence has been indirectly exerted, largely through surrogates
in the ANZUS alliance system."'5 4  The Baltic has long been
considered a "closed sea" by the Soviet Union. Both zones equate
to de jure recognition of a nuclear free status.) Like the Latin
American Nuclear Free Zone, SPNFZ was established in a region that
did not have nuclear weapons. Like the Nordic NWFZ the
establishment of SPNFZ was a de facto recognition of the South
Pacific's already nuclear free status,
"...if it is agreed that the term 'Nuclear Free' is a synonym
for 'Nuclear Weapons Free', then the South Pacific has always
been deserving of being thus designated. None of its states
has the technology to produce such Xapons, nor do they store
them on behalf of states that do.""
However, the region within the SPNFZ "...was not an arena of
superpower competition"'5 6 as is the Baltic and the surrounding
waters of the Nordic NWFZ. The nuclear free status prior to SPNFZ
...was perceived by South Pacific states as having no guaranteed
5 4W.T. Roy "The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone and Regional
Security (With Special reference to Sea Lanes of Communication)"
Journal of Australian Naval Institute, Volume 15, Number 3, August
1989, p. 27.
5 5Roy, p. 27.
5 6 ibid.
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permanence. ' 57  The Soviet threat in the South Pacific has not
been of military in nature but "...the appearance of Soviet
influence in the South Pacific... is regarded as unwelcome or even
threatening.... "58so to ensure nuclear free status for the South
Pacific and preclude further Soviet presence, SPNFZ was created.
SPNFZ may or may not provide the guarantee of a Nuclear Free Zone
(NFZ) that the South Pacific seeks. The guarantee has not been
tested by conflict within the region, only after conflict
particularly heightened conflict can the guarantee of a NFZ be
tested.
The Latin American NWFZ established by the Treaty of
Tlatelolco is considered as a model for emulation. It has been
signed by all Latin American states except Cuba and ratified by
all signatories except Argentina. The treaty "prohibits not only
the acquisition of nuclear weapons by its parties but also the
stationing of nuclear weapons within their territory... It provides
for the conduct of such explosions by or for the benefit of its
parties under international supervision but also contains a
definition of 'nuclear weapons' that appears to preclude the
possession or development of peaceful nuclear explosives by parties
to the treaty."'5 9 The Latin American NWFZ is unique in that "there
5 7 Ibid.
5 8 Ibid.
5 9 Nuclear Arms Control Background And Issues, Committee on
International Security and Arms Control, National Academy of
Sciences (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1985), pp. 246
- 247.
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were no nuclear weapons in the region; the regional initiative was
originally supported by all of the region's principal states...and
there was no serious impact on existing mutual security
arrangcements 60Yes, but future mutual security arrangements may or
may not be affected. Elimination of the American nuclear presence
does not in itself guarantee peace. Erling Bjol, Professor, Aarhus
University in Denmark, recognizes that such a "Soviet-defined zone
"...would not constitute any real guarantee for the security of the
Nordic countries which declare their territory a nuclear-free
zone. ,,61
6 0 Ibid., p. 248.
6 1 Erling Bjol, "Nordic Security" Adelphi Papers Number 181
(London: The International Institute For Strategic Studies, 1983),
p. 28.
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IV. HISTORICAL PATTERN OF SOVIET NORDIC NWFZ PROPOSALS
"The campaign for a nuclear-free Nordic zone had its roots in
Finland, although the idea was first advanced by the Soviet
leadership in letters from Premier Bulganin to the Nordic Chiefs
of Government in 1958 and was repeated by Khrushchev in his 1959
Riga speech."6 2 It should be noted that the idea of a Nordic NWFZ
first emeiged "in an era when the US Thor and Jupiter medium-range
missiles were being considered for deployment by NATO European
countries (they were accepted only in Britain, Italy, and
Turkey)." 6 3 In 1982 Brezhnev "...fully endorsed the idea (military
free zones) and called for states outside the Indian Ocean to
freeze development of military bases and halt deployment of large
naval fleets there."
6 4
Nuclear disarmament by the year 2000 is the goal that Chairman
Gorbachev has set for the world. "The Soviet Union proposes that
a step-by-step, consistent process of ridding the earth of nuclear
weapons be implemented and completed within the next 15 years,
before the end of the century. ,65 Proposed is "...complete
62J. Borawski and J. Valentine, "Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones:
The Nordic Case" Naval Forces, Vol. 9:3, 1988, p. 67.
6 3 Ibid.
6 4
"Brezhnev proposes military free zones" Washington Times,
22 September 1982, p. 7.
6 5
"Nuclear Disarmament By The Year 2000" Statement by Mikhail
Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, The New
York Times, February 5, 1986, p. A13.
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elimination of medium-range missiles of the USSR and the USA in the
European zone - both ballistic and cruise missiles - as a first
step towards ridding the European continent of nuclear weapons."
6 6
The INF Treaty established the removal of all Pershing IIs and
Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCMs) from European soil. The
Soviet Union advocates that "... the United States should undertake
not to transfer its strategic and medium-range missiles to other
countries."'6 7 This is a reference to the sale of Tridents to the
United Kingdom by the United States.
The Soviet Union has historically advocated the establishment
of NWFZs. There is a tendency for the misinformed individual to
equate NWFZ proposals with Gorbachev and to forget what the Soviet
Union is seeking to achieve. Sought is breathing space or
peredyshka. The Soviet Union does not hide its strategy and its
leader states that,
S...one can imagine the extensive untapped potential for
peaceful coexistence that can be found in restructuring in
the Soviet Union alone. By ensuring our (Soviet) attainment
of the world level in all the most important economic indices,
restructuring will make it possible for this huge and very
rich country to join in the worldwide division of labor and
resources as never before."
68
Soviet foreign policy has historically been very pragmatic and




"Gorbachev: 'New Thinking' in World Affairs", The Current
Digest Of the Soviet Press, Volume XXXIX, No. 45, December 9, 1987,
p. 14.
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competing goals in which there are often one-for-one tradeoffs
(i.e., increasing contact and openness with Western Europe versus
maintaining strict control of Eastern Europe.) The ultimate
triumph of removing the American presence in Europe is a long-term
objective but one cannot assume that this goal would take
precedence over all goals in Soviet decision-making, that there are
no competing goals that put a restraint on Soviet efforts in this
direction and that the Soviets have a single minded master plan
intended to maximize conflict between the United States and Western
Europe.
"...the Soviet Union has engaged the Atlantic Alliance in a
long-term competition in peacetime. The Soviets have
attempted to use the Western interests in arms control as a
means of advancing their interests in the East-West
competition - as an instrument to help move what they call
'the correlation of forces' in their favor; and in preparing
for the unwanted and improbable contingency of war - as a
means of undermining the West's military posture so that war
outcomes will be more likely to favor the Soviet Union."6
Gorbachev's Murmansk Address is seen as another vehicle for
the movement of 'the correlation of forces' in the Soviets' favor.
Sought is a de jure nuclear disarmament of the Nordic region but
it is not difficult to perceive that the ultimate goal is the
removal of the American nuclear guarantee from Europe.
"The Soviets feel that the establishment of NATO and the
United States presence in Europe have deprived the USSR of an
ideological, geographical, and power-based 'right' to dominate
all of Europe... In order to achieve a position of dominance
in an 'all-European' order, the Soviet Union has sought
gradually to neutralize United States security guarantees to
6 9 David S. Yost, "Soviet Aims in Europe" Society, vol. 24, No.
5 (July/August 1987), p. 73.
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Western Europe and to promote ,feduction in the United States
military and nuclear presence.
The Soviet Union has not altered its course, it has only adopted
more sophisticated techniques in seeking its objectives. No longer
can Soviet leaders pound their shoes on a table to get their point
across. Nor can they demand compliance with their initiatives.
But if their initiatives are packaged in terms palatable for the
West using phrases such as CBMs and reasonable sufficiency then the
likelihood of success in the Soviet achievement of its objectives
is greatly enhanced. Gorbachev's Murmansk Address, an example of
the sophisticated Soviet statesmanship that the world is witnessing
today, speaks of a common heritage of the inhabitants of the
Eurasian continent. This common heritage is linked with the need
for a common European defense structure. What is not said is just
as important as what is said for, by omission, the Soviet Union
could be seeking a common defense structure void of the United
States.
7 0 Tbid., pp. 72-73.
31
A. GORBACHEV'S DESIGN: HIS MURMANSK ADDRESS
President Gorbachev delivered an address in Murmansk, USSR on
October 1, 1987 which haJ profound implications for the "Nordic
Balance". Lirect and indirect ctatements wore made which directed
the audien~e's attention to the issue of nuclear warfare with
special erphasis upon the Arctic and Northern Europe. Gorbachev
speaks of a changing Soviet foreign policy. He states that,
"One of the elements of the ch-r.;e is t"at it is now hard to
convince people that our foreign policy, the policy of the
Soviet Union, our initi.atives, our nuclear-free world program
are mere 'propaganda".
Gorbachev speaks of concern for the world situation and states that
S... our (Soviet) policy is an invitation to a dialogue, to a
search, to a better world, to normalizcd international relations.
''7 2
"Normalized" is interpreted to mean a nuclear free environment as
defined by the Soviet Union. The Soviet leader speaks of gaining
favorable trends in his reference to the Strategic Arms Reduction
Talks (START) by saying that "frank East-West dialogue (is) far
from having no result for both sides.. .we are close to a major step
in the field of real nuclear disarmament.
7 3
7 1
"USSR Foreign Relations" Mikhail Gorbachev, General
Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Ui.on, Delivered in Murmansk, USSR, October 1, 1987, Vital
Speeches of the Day, December 15, 1987, p. 130.
7 2 Gorbachev, p. 130.
7 3 Ibid.
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President Gorbachev cites "The North (as a) problem of
security for the Soviet Union, of its northern frontiers."'7 4 He
claims that "major initiatives in the sphere of international
security and disarmament are linked with the names of famous
political figures of Northern Europe." 7 5 The implication is that
the historical precedence has been set; it would only be natural
for present Northern leaders to continue the trend. Referring to
the NATO and the WTO, Gorbachev declares it possible ". ..to take
simultaneously the roads of bilateral and multilateral
cooperation ,citing 'our common European home' as the basis for
cooperation.7 7  "A home for all of Europe, a common European
home.. .has become a lasting feature of (Soviet) political
activities. Seen are references to the concept of a demilitarized
Europe... European arms pools... European defense community.. .all-
European infrastructure of strategic stability.
7 8
An inference emerges to the Soviet desire to circumvent the
American military, most specifically the American nuclear presence
in Europe. The Soviet Union and the Nordic nations are littoral






"ArticleViews Need for 'Common European Home'" PM 1710130188
Moscow Pravda in Russian 15 Oct 88, Second Edition, p. 4., FBIS-
SOV-203, 20 October 1988, pp. 9-110.
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The United States is an "outsider". "We (the Soviets) must also
take account of geopolitical factors: the United States is
overseas, the USSR is right alongside."'7 9 The Soviet Union seeks
a diminishment of the American nuclear presence in the region.
"Without American protection, Europe would be vulnerable to the
Soviets' superiority in conventional forces."'8 0 The Soviet Union
and the WTO already have a preponderance of conventional force in
Europe, clearly holding the advantage over the United States and
NATO not just in manpower but in geographic terms. The Soviet
Union has the advantage of proximity to the region whereas the
United States does not, even though the United States is aligned
with two of the North European nations. "The combination of
geographical position, conventional military superiority and a
stand-off at the strategic-nuclear level gives the Soviet Union an
overall military and, therefore, political advantage over the
United States in the struggle for Europe.",
8 1
President Gorbachev proposes that "... all countries concerned
should embark on talks on the limitation and scaling down of
military activity in the North as a whole, in both the Eastern and
7 9
"European Arms Control Prospects Viewed" PM0310152388 Moscow
Izvestiva in Russian 2 Oct 88, FBIS-SOV-88-192, 4 October 1988,
"Arms Control & Disarmament", p. 1.
8 0John Barry, Margaret Garrard Warner and Evan Thomas, "After
The Cold War" Newsweek, May 15, 1989, p. 23.
8 1 Francis P. Sempa, "Geopolitics And American Strategy: A
Reassessment" Strategic Review, Spring 1987, p. 34.
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Western Hemispheres.''8 2  He defines his parameters for such
limitation and delineates the following,
1. The willingness and the preparedness of the Soviet Union
to d(t d gudLc1tALor of a nuclear weapon-free zone in Northern
Europe but defers to the participating countries for the
formalization of the guarantee, (Implied is the joint
cooperation of the Soviet Union and the Nordic nations in
the maintenance of such a zone).
2. Moscow's reaffirmation of its readiness to discuss with the
Nordic nations, the problems relating to the creation of a
nuclear-free zone, including possible measures to the Soviet
territory and raises the possibility of removing Soviet
ballistic missiles from the Soviet Baltic Fleet,
3. Welcomes the initiative of Finland's President Koivisto
regarding the restriction of naval activity in the sea
of Northern Europe,
4. Specifies the limitation measures such as arrangements on
the limitations of rivalry in antisubmarine weapons,
notification of large naval and air force exercises,
invitation of observers from all countries participating
in the "European process to large naval and air force
exercises",
5. Proposes the banning of naval activity in mutually agreed
zone of international straits and intensive shipping lanes
and,
6. Encourages the cooperation of the Nordic nations in
environmental protection, by setting an example through the
monitoring of Me natural environment and radiation safety
in the region.
1. "New Thinking" or Just New Packaging?
The adoption of a Nordic NWFZ would not only remove the
American nuclear guarantee from the Nordic region but also set a
8 2
"USSR Foreign Relations" Mikhail Gorbachev, General
Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union, Delivered in Murmansk, USSR, October 1, 1987, Vital
Speeches of the Day, December 15, 1987, p. 132.
8 3 Ibid., pp. 132-133.
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precedent for removal of the American nuclear guarantee from not
only other areas of Europe but other regions of the world. The
Soviet Union has enjoyed a geojaphical and conventional military
power advantage in Eurasia.
"In geopolitical terms, China and Western Europe are two large
weights on the peripheries of the Eurasian landmass adjacent
to the Soviet Heartland. The effective control of either
territory by the Soviet Union - through direct conquest or
political hegemony - would drasticall shift the 'correlation
of woild forces'in Moscow's favor."
Christoph Bertram in his article, "Europe's Security Dilemmas"
states that,
"...Mr. Gorbachev's proposals for removing all Soviet and
American nuclear weapons from the territory of Europe may
genuinely be meant as a first step toward removing the threat
of war, but they could also serve the old objective of making
Europe safe for Soviet military dominance by removing the link
between the security of Western Europe and that of the United
States. Whatever tests the West may devise to evaluate thp5
'new thinking' in Moscow, they will yield ambiguous results."
Underlying the rationale for removing both Soviet and American
nuclear weapons is the disengagement of Europe from the "two
nuclear giants" Michael Howard in "A European Perspective on the
Reagan Years" states that,
"'Europe,' both East and West, they (opposition groups within
Europe) argue, should detach itself from the dominance of its
alien masters and constitute itself a stable, nonaligned 'zone
of peace' between the two nuclear giants. If Western Europe
were to detach itself from the United States, so the thesis
goes, the Soviet Union would no longer need to maintain its
protective glacis in Eastern Europe, and the potentially
84Francis P. Sempa, "Geopolitics And American Strategy: A
Reassessment" Strategic Review, Spring 1987, p. 36.
85Christoph Bertram, "Europe's Security Dilemmas" Foreign
Affairs Summer 1987, p. 945.
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lethal confrontation across the Iron Curtain would come to anend.,,"
This is not the "mainstream" argument but one whose "plausibility
is increased by the accommodating and reasonable attitude that
Gorbachev's Russia is now beginning to adopt toward European
affairs.,,87
2. Zone of Peace Initiative
Professor Claude Buss of the Naval Postgraduate School
contends that in making a threat analysis, one must consider
possible threats within a 360 degree radius from where one sits.
Using this same rationale, one must contemplate a Soviet analysis
using Moscow as the center of the circle. The question then arises
as to how far is the Kremlin willing to go to protect its radius.
Threat analysis is just as real for the Soviet Union as it is for
the United States. A dilemma arises in anticipation of an
opponent's threat analyses and that is knowing when, where and how
to maneuver. The West does not want to be outmaneuvered by the
Soviet Union. It can not afford to move too fast but yet it must
not allow itself to be outmaneuvered,
"...this is not the time to go slow in disarmament
preparations or to hold Mr. Gorbachev and his initiatives at
arm's length. We (United States) should seize the
opportunity to cut deals we (United S tes) otherwise have
wanted but have been unable to negotiate."
8 6Michael Howard, "A European Perspective on the Reagan Years"
ForeiQn Affairs, America and the World 1987/88, p. 491.
8 7 ibid.
8 8Jeremy J. Stone, "Let's Do All We Can for Gorbachev" The New
York Times, February 6, 1989, p. A15.
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The United States should lead the way for the West through the
establishment of a positive policy. Sought is not just a response
to negatives but a diminishment of a "us" versus "them" situation.
Most importantly, the policy should not result in a counter-
proposal adverse to US national security. Washington does not want
to make the mistake of coming out against NWFZz in general.
Supporters of a NWFZ contends that such a zone would
constitute a Zone of Neutrality (ZON). This is misleading for a
ZON does not equate to a Zone of Peace (ZOP) or a NWFZ. Neutrality
equates to nonalignment but not necessarily peace or the banishment
of nuclear weapons. "The military doctrine of both the US and the
Soviet Union (or indeed of any state) must contend with the fact
that nuclear weapons have different and often contradictory
aspects, depending upon the context in which they are viewed."'8 9
Strategic weapons are part of thc global threat. How these weapons
are perceived is critical. In other words, the threat perception
of strategic weapons can often be more vital than the weapons
themselves. "The maintenance of a military-strategic parity
(balance) guarantees strategic stability" 9 0  with strategic
stability as the goal. "The survival of the Soviet Union is found
in its ability to meet the American threat. "The Soviet Union is
just as vulnerable, as is the United States, to the forces which
8 9John Van Oudenaren, "Deterrence, War-fighting and Soviet
Military Doctrine," Adelphi Papers 210 (London: The International
Institute for Strategic Studies, 1986) p. 7.
9 0The Evolution of Military Art: Stages, Tendencies,
Principles" JPRS-UMA-89-012-L, 12 October 1989, p. 115.
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throughout history have brought down every great empire. In many
ways, the Soviet Union is more vulnerable... ''91 The uncertainty of
Gorbachev's tenure and the weakness of the Soviet economy make the
Soviet Union more susceptible to collapse. "The Soviet economy is
so 'unstable' that it easily could collapse in the face of a large
shock such as a prolonged strike or widespread civil unrest."'9 2
a. Is It Really a Confidence Building Measure?
Frequent reference to CBMs are found throughout
Soviet literature regarding arms control. But are NWFZs CBMs? The
establishment of NWFZs would eliminate surprise attacks upon the
Soviet homeland and Warsaw Pact nations. NWFZs like,
"...zones of reduced levels of arms would be created along
the boundary between NATO and the Warsaw Pact and confidence-
building measures would be considerably expanded, which would
make it possible to carry out more painstaking reciprocal
monitoring of the sides' military activity. This is of
paramount importance, not the least for the creation of
reciprocal confide-'-P, at a time when Europe is 'crammed' with
armed forces to ar unf recedented degree and when the opposing
sides have deployed enormous military might. This would
indisputably not be able to replace the talks (arms control
negotiations) themselves but it would, of course, be able t3
alter their atmosphere - and that would be very valuable."
(Emphasis added)
Robin Ranger in his article "Learning From the Naval Arms
Control Experience" states that "arms control regimes cannot be
insulated from the broader political and military relationships
91Joseph C. Harsch "Moscow woes should reassure the US" The
Christian Science Monitor, April 29, 1988, p. 11.
92"U.S. report says economy of USSR will likely worsen" The
Japan Times, April 22, 1990, p. 1.
93
"European Arms Control Prospects Viewed" FBIS-SOV-88-192,
p. 2.
39
between the parties to them.''9 4 American approaches to nuclear
deterrence and international stability have sometimes included an
assumption that a universally valid strategic wisdom has been
discovered in the United States, and that the Soviet Union should
accept it. Examples include the effort during the SALT
negotiations to 'educate' the Soviets about the merits of mutual
vulnerability, the 1985 'strategic concept' of eliminating
offensive nuclear forces in conjunction with the buildup of
strategic defenses, and the proposals to encourage an evolution in




Too dangerous for the United States to assume that it holds the
universally valid strategic wisdom mentioned above. The Soviet
Union tends to believe that it holds the universally valid
strategic wisdom.
A Nordic NWFZ is a CBM in that it would designate the North
as nuclear weapon free but it would only appear as a CBM on paper.
In reality, tensions would be heightened and the internal and
external nations bordering the zone would be more susceptible to
coercion and attack. A Nordic NWFZ is a CBM only for the Soviet
Union for it would bolster Soviet confidence in the outcome of a
potential NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict. The Soviet Union retains the
advantage of proximity and any effort to eliminate nuclear weaponry
9 4 Robin Ranger, "Learning From the Naval Arms Control
Experience" The Washington Quarterly Summer 1987, p. 56.
9 5 David S. Yost, Public Opinion, Political Culture, and
Nuclear Weapons in the Western Alliance, third draft, May 1989, p.
20.
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from an adversary, particularly its main adversary, the United
States only serves to enhance the warfighting capabilities of the
Soviet Union.
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V. SOVIET MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN THE NORTH
Soviet naval exercises like those of the United States Navy
are intended to improve the fleet's ability to function in accord
with their strategy. For the Soviets, this means control of the
flanks of Europe. Seen is a new dimension in the Soviet Navy of
practicing, training and building a fleet to control the Atlantic
right off American shores. "Peaceful training tasks"96designed to
reinforce the defense capacity of the country is the official
Soviet perception of its naval exercises. Soviet military
officials state that naval exercise patterns are a reflection of
a changed Soviet perception in the military doctrine of the
"Imperialist States" (a strategic plan to disperse US Kival
combatant ships in more ports and to make the job of blocking the
US fleet with mines by a potential enemy more difficult) and
detailed naval operations in support of a European conventional
war. But, at first glance the alleged reduction in large exercises
could be interpreted as indicative of a general trend within the
Soviet Navy of reduced naval deployments. The Soviet Union has
cosmetically cutback on overseas deployments and has stopped
carrying out ambitious naval exercises from the Soviet territory.
Marshal Sergei F. Akhromeyev, the Soviet military chief, while
96Vladimir Chernavin, FBIS, 26 July 1985, p. V2.
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visiting the United States in 1988, claimed that the cutback was
"an example of Moscow's new effort to develop a purely defensive
military doctrine."'9 7 This claim is designed to persuade NATO
Europe of the Soviet commitment to arms reductions with the
reduction of naval exercises cited as visible proof.
Defense is paramount to the Soviet Armed Forces. The Soviet
Navy operates as part of a combined arms team and as such is part
of a centralized Soviet military strategy. All Soviet military
strategic planning is organized from the top down, on a unified
basis, with the Soviet Navy traditionally ranked fifth.
Gorbachev's call for nuclear-free and demilitarized zones in
the east resulted from increased American and NATO exercise
activity in the 1980s, in seas close to the Soviet Union.
Ligachev, during a 1986 visit to Finland, called for Soviet
ballistic missile submarines be removed from the Baltic in exchange
for a NATO agreement on a nuclear-free north Europe and curtailment
or elimination of large-scale naval exercises from the North,
Norwegian, Barents and Baltic Seas.9 8 An interpretation of Lev
Yudovich is that "the Soviets mean a combination of military,
ideological, psychological, economic, diplomatic, and other kinds
of war against Western Europe and the United States."'9 9 Warsaw Pact
97Michael R. Gordon, "Soviets Scale Back Naval Deployments And
Large Exercises" New York Times July 17, 1988, p. 1.
9 8 David Alan Rosenberg, "It is Hardly Possible to Imagine
Anything Worse": Soviet Thoughts on the Maritime Strategy", Naval
War College Review, Summer 1988, p. 82.
9 9 yudovich, p. 39.
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leadership in the spring of 1987 furthered the "zone of peace"
initiative with the adoption of The New Military Doctrine of the
Warsaw Pact States. Emphasizing more than just Pact solidarity,
this new doctrine incorporated an array of proposals for arms
reduction, negotiations and crisis controls between East and West.
Its principal goal was the creation of zones of peace in various
regions of Europe and other parts of the world free from nuclear
and chemical weapons with zones of reduced concentration of
armaments and increased trust. The implementation of military
confidence-building measures in Europe on a mutual basis was
advocated as well as the attainment of accords on such measures in
other areas of the world as well as on the seas and oceans.
1 0 0
Maritime strategy has produced a serious counter-initiative in the
form of the Soviet proposal regarding "zones of peace". Moscow
believes that the current posture of the American Navy poses a
potential threat to the achievement of its objectives should war
occur. To counter this threat, Moscow proposes,
"The zones-of-peace concept, while contributing to Gorbachev's
multifaceted foreign policy efforts aimed at projecting the
image of the Soviet Union as the chief architect of peace in
the 1980s and 1990s, would also, if agreed to by the West,
virtually eliminate the U.S. Navy's program of joint and
combined exercises. By denying the United States the
opportunity to practice the operations envisaged in the
Maritime Strategy, the Soviet Union could seriously impair
Western capability to nduct those operations under difficult
wartime conditions.11
1 0 0Rosenberg, p. 82.
1 0 1 Ibid, p. 101.
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These Soviet overtures are more than just propaganda and constitute
a serious response to the challen"c- lad down by the American
initiative. This type of response is a most significant Soviet
commentary on me-itime strategy.
Dominating Soviet strategy is national military doctrine, 'a
system of views adcpted in a state fc a given period of time on
the objectives and character of a pessible war, on the preparation
of the country and the armed forces for war, and on the methods of
waging war.'1 0 2 The political goal of Gorbachev is the elimination
of all nuclear weapons worldwide. However logical inconsistencies
exist in this declaration. The Soviet Union claims its military
doctrine to be "uniquely defensive. ,103 Moscow is well aware of the
fact that if it can convince the rest of the world, most
particularly its immediate neighbors and allies to disarm nuclear-
wise, Soviet success in a potential NATO-WTO conflict can be
greatly enhanced. "The USSR and its armed forces possess
sufficient military and combat potential despite the fact that this
1 0 2 Ibid., p. 98.
1 0 3TheUSSR has pledged not to use nuclear weapons first, and
it will adhere to it in the strictest fashion. But it is no secret
that scenarios in which we (the Soviet Union) are subjected to
nuclear attack exist. We (the Soviet Union) have no right not to
take them into account." Lenin, V. I., "Poln.sobr.soch." [Complete
Collected Works], Vol 36, p. 396 as quoted in "The Evolution of
Military Art: Stages, Tendencies, Principles JPRS-UMA-89-012-L, 12
October 1989, p. 1.
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requires spending money which could be used for the good of man,
for the purposes of creation."
1 0 4
Subordinate to military strategy is operational art which
incorporates the theory and practice of conducting joint and
independent operations. As naval exercises reflect military art,
it has been postulated that recent Soviet naval exercise patterns,
particula~iy since 1985 (the year Gorbachev came to power as the
newest Soviet Secretary General) reflect a revision in Soviet
military strategy. The trend reveals the exertion of Soviet
pressure upon the NATO Nordic allies to favorably influence a US
response to Soviet arms control reductlgns proposals, but does not
indicate a revision in Soviet military theory. "We (Soviets) are
realists, and we cannot ignore the fact that the ruling circles of
imperialist countries stand on different positions incompatible
with the peace-loving goals of the UfSR's foreign policy."
1 0 5
Diminished is the role of the surface ship and emphasized is the
strategic role of the Soviet submarine force in defense of the
Soviet homeland. This is not a revision of Soviet military theory,
"Soviet military doctrine has not changed. Rather, the
changes are in the military-technical aspect of military
doctrine. The military-technical aspect of the new Soviet
military dcctrine is defensive in nature, which has caused
some disquiet and consternation among the professional
military who have matured in a military system that
1 0 4
"The Evolution of Military Art: Stages, Tendencies,
Principles" JPRS-JMA-89-012-L, 12 October 1989, p. 115.
1 0 5 Ibid
.
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tradit ually stressed the offensive nature of military
Moscow has always stressed defensive and offensive strategy
and the Soviets will call upon both offensive and defensive forces
in a NATO/Warsaw Pact conflict. Obviously, conventional warfare
will be used first in an with the hopes of ending the conflict on
the conventional plane. The use of nuclear weaponry would destroy
Western European territory and its industrialized regions, which
the Kremlin so desperately covets as the potential victor in such
a clash. But the Soviets have not ruled out the use of nuclear
forces in a just war or in defense of the Socialist homeland,
S... the Soviet Union intends, as before, to increase its fighting
capabilities so that it can conduct wars and can prepare the
country 'for armed defense using not only nuclear arms but also
conventional weapons with very effective means of destruction. 1 0
7
Moscow is well aware that the Warsaw Pact is operating from
a position of inferiority in the North against NATO,
"NATO countries exceed the Warsaw Treaty countries in the
strength of naval personnel by 4.5 times, the number of ocean-
going ships 7.6 times, and the gross tonnage of ships 3 times.
The U.S. 'new sea strategy' presupposes establishment of
control over all areas of the world ocean. Ocean-going ships
make up 65 percent in the ship composition of the U.S. Navy,
and ships of coastal operation, 6 per cent... the Soviet Navy,
apart from submarines with ballistic missiles which are
subject to talks on cutting strategic weapons, is assigned for
the defence of Soviet coast. 52 per cent of warships are
1 0 6 Lev Yudovich, "Warsaw Pact's New Military Doctrine: More
Velvet Glove, Less Iron Fist" Armed Forces Journal International,
February, 1988, p. 38.
1 0 7 Ibid., p. 38.
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vesselsmo coastal operation and only 12 per cent are ocean-going
ships.",1
Furthermore, "failure is evident in a military that now consumes
at least 15-20 percent of the nation's product but cannot prevent
a Cessna 172 from landing in Red Square, and allows Afghan rebels
to defeat the mighty Red Army. ''I 09
Soviet national goals, William Manthorpe says in his article
"What Is Pushing Gorbachev Into Arms Control", can still be
inferred to include defense of the Russian homeland and the Soviet
state and the maintenance of dominance over the land and sea areas
adjacent to Soviet borders.ll0The goal of strengthening the Soviet
system is as important as strengthening the Soviet state, but
defense of the Soviet homeland is still paramount. Manthorpe
further points out that the inherent character of the Soviet Union
as a garrison state precludes a change in the Soviet perspective
in response to a changing world environment,"the Soviets do not
intend to change their underlying mind set, national goals, or
fundamental approach to implementing national strategy.. .All they
need to do is to change the primary method of implementing their
strategy.""'lGorbachev realizes though that the garrison state can
1 0 8
"Baltic Fleet Exercises Held 6-8 Sep" LD0909140288 Moscow
Tass, 9 September 1988, FBIS-SOV-88-176, 12 September 1988, p. 70.
1 0 9Allison, p. 20.
1 1 OCaptain William H. J. Manthorpe, USN, Ret., "What Is




not survive on massive military strength alone. The Soviet system
can only be strengthened through restructuring of the political and
economic bureaucracy and reconstruction of the national economy.
"Internal reductions are needed as well. Only by reaching
agreements on arms reduction and confidence-building measures
can Gorbachev convince the Soviet military leaders ,iq2move
their services toward adopting a defensive doctrine."
The wartime role of the Soviet Navy has been to keep American
warships from approaching Soviet territory and the protection of
Soviet missile-firing submarines deployed close to the Soviet
Union. The establishment of a Nordic NWFZ would accomplish this
goal. It is highly questionable if the character of Soviet defense
has undergone such a drastic revision. Seen is a more aggressive
application of the defensive strategy incorporating both defensive
measures close to Soviet soil. Naval operations conducted close
to the Soviet mainland is a departure from pre-1986 exercises.
Heightened NATO response in the Northern Flank is the result of
recent developments there. "...two recently confirmed developments
in the Soviet Northern Fleet, based in the Kola peninsula region.
Four Typhoon-class strategic submarines are now based just 40 km
(50 km is a more accurate figure) from the Norwegian border and
aging Yankee-class strategic subs are now being refitted to carry
new SSN-21 'smart' cruise missiles. The Typhoon base is in Guba
Zapadnaya Litsa fjord."'I 1 3 Norway frequently complains about this.
1 1 2 ibid
.
1 1 3 Rolf Soderlind, 'Soviet Sub Developments Prompt Call for
More NATO Northern Exercises" Armed Forces Journal International,
March 1988, p. 32.
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Moscow cites its "changed" naval exercise pattern as a "new
practical step in the history of the activity in military
fleets."'1 1 4 Admiral Ivanov, Commander of the Baltic Fleet states
"Our country has not only advanced the concept of new
political thinking but also begun implementing this itself,
including broader glasnost in the sphere of military activity.
Of course, comparable steps by N% would serve as evidence
of greater mutual understanding."
Soviet analysis has correctly identified changes in American
geo-political interests as well as options for naval operations in
the event of war. There exists a certain sense of urgency on the
need to respond to the operational challenges posed by the maritime
strategy. "According to many Western Sovietologists, external
expansion served an essential ideological role in justifying the
Soviet regime at home."'1 1 6 But too many people are too quick to
applaud Soviet "revisionism" without carefully examining the facts,
particularly how they equate to historical trends. The Soviet
Union is foremost a land-based power and as such, defense of its
homeland and its self-professed "common European homeland" shared
by Western Europeans is paramount. Expulsion of the United States
from the European continent and enforced political domination of
the Eurasian land mass by the Soviet Union is still the key
objective in a Warsaw Pact/NATO conflict. The United States must
1 1 4
"Paper Describes Exercise" PM1209090788 Moscow Krasnava
Zvezda 9 Sep 1988, FBIS-SOV-88-176, 12 September 1988, p. 72.
115ibid
.
1 1 6Allison, p. 61.
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never forget this long term objective of the Kremlin. Moscow will
further the objective at whatever the cost and via whatever avenue
available.
"Gorbachev's main purpose is to guarantee and enhance the
Soviet Union's position as a great power. To that end, he
seeks breathing space, peredyshka. His words and deeds,
attempt to cope with competing challenges: to secure his
position in the struggle for power at home; to provide a
framework that will allow him to shift resources from defense
to more productive investments; and to maintain a posture
plausible enough to ,,@ow him to constrain Western arms
through arms control."
Scviet literature has begun to downplay the emphasis on sea-
based nuclear weapons which has dominated their characterization
of the role of the US Navy in the 1970s. "The nuclear correlations
cf forces remains critical in Soviet thinking about general war,
but renewed emphasis has also been placed on the traditional sea-
control role of the Western naval forces."'1 18 David Alan Rosenberg
in his article "It is Hardly Possible to Imagine Anything Worse":
Soviet Thoughts on the Maritime Strategy" concludes that the
formulations of the maritime strategy although not given full
credence as military theory are contributing in to the reevaluation
present in the Soviet Union today regarding the role of nuclear








Senior American military officials believe that the cutback
in Soviet naval exercises reflects budgetary restraints and does
not portend an important change in Soviet military doctrine. One
must remember, when interpreting claims that Soviet military
doctrine has not undergone a revision, that the basic requirement
of Soviet military doctrine remains and that is - defeat of the
West in a clash involving defense of the Socialist homeland. This
has not changed. General John R. Galvin, USA, Supreme Allied
Commander Europe (SACEUR) states,
"The key to it in terms of Western security is to look at the
Soviet military organization and see what actual changes take
place. So far there ave not been any - except that they get
better every year."
Indications are that Soviet power projection has been
diminished in priority accompanied by a limiting of size of new
military programs. Disappeared is the reference to the liberating
mission of the Soviet military. The Soviet military has adopted
a type of cost-benefit analysis. Present is a genuine need to make
foreign policy less expensive for the Soviet Union and this extends
to naval exercises. Naval exercises, particularly those involving
surface combatants, are visible signs of military force. Such
exercises are often touted by politicians and legislators as the
first visible sign of a genuine intent in the reduction of arms and
defense spending. The Kremlin is attempting to become more
"Westernized", employing this same rationale in an effort to beat
120Henryvan Loon, "An exclusive AFJI interview with: General
John R. Galvin, USA, Supreme Allied Commander Europe" Armed Forces
Journal International, March 1988, p. 52.
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the United States at her own game. Moscow is using the issue of
arms control through surface naval exercises to reduce defense
cutbacks to an East-West contest. The Kremlin is out to prove that
it is to be the master of its destiny, either passively or actively
in the East-West contest. If it can influence NATO Europe or part
of the coalition, it will do so to achieve its goal.
Moscow is exhibiting a heightened emphasis upon the political
tools for the achievement of its foreign policy objectives such as
the resolution of arms control reductions between the East and the
West. Manifested as a contest between the two super powers, author
Lev Yudovich sees the Soviet Union as,
"...a superpower having strategic parity with the United
States while at the same time conducting a policy that pursues
the use of political measures rather than armed force to
secure their goals. The Soviets, however, do not intend to
abandon the threat of armed forces; instead they plan to use
political measures as the means ofI.rst resort in pursuit of
their foreign policy objectives."
This thesis opened with a discussion of military and political
tools uses in the resolution of arms control issues. The Nordic
NWFZ proposal is considered a military and political tool used by
the Soviets in the realization of its foreign policy objectives.
Naval exercises are tools used in the exercise of Soviet military
and political persuasion upon the North.
The fact that the exercises employing large Soviet naval
surface forces have been curtailed in an effort to economize
domestically can not be ignored. But the underlying force behind
121yudovich, p. 38.
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the reduction of Soviet naval exercises is the conviction that the
Kremlin can bolster its image as a "peace loving nation" committed
to arms reductions between the two superpowers and their allies.
Naval exercises can be interpreted as very visible displays of
power projection when conducted on the grand scale of Soviet naval
exercises of the past. Soviet naval exercises have been
constricted as a play to world and more particularly NATO public
opinion. The reduction of exercises coupled with the appropriate
publicity provides the citizenry of NATO Europe with immediate
testimony of the Soviet pledge to arms reduction and draws
attention, acutely to the continuance of United States naval
exercises in the same region and by inference, the lack of
commitment to arms reduction by the "aggressive imperialistic
American war mongers."
The reduction of Soviet surface combatant naval exercises in
the Northern Flank corresponds with the appointment of Mikhail
Gorbachev as the Soviet Secretary General in 1985. It is too soon
to determine if this is merely coincidental. With him came a
revolution in Soviet foreign policy. "New thinking" was advocated
and Gorbachev was out to prove that past assumptions and
generalizations regarding the Soviet Union were no longer valid.
Glasnost of Soviet foreign policy has been accompanied by a linkage
of key international issues such as arms control and the resolution
of regional conflicts with issues designed to dethrone the United
States as the supreme superpower and bolster the superpower status
of the Soviet Union, domestically and internationally. Paramount
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is the notion that Soviet foreign policy will no longer be viewed
through the prism of the United States. Soviet considerations will
equally be weighed.
David Alan Rosenberg states,
"The trend in Soviet naval activities, with a decline in
deployment levels out of area, tactical exercises conducted
closer to home waters, and reduction in submarine excursions
is an enigma which has not been convincingly explained. An
operational concept based on forming defensive rings around
strategic submarines, and deployments closer to the S yet
homeland - the Bastion theory - may be an explanation."
Like all statistics, the statistics regarding Soviet naval exercise
patterns since Gorbachev can be fashioned to support whatever
thesis, the analyst is striving to prove. The trends may or may
not be indicative of a changed military philosophy for the Soviet
Navy. The trend may only be temporary and coincidentally
correspond with appointment of Gorbachev as Secretary General. He
has only been in office for a short period and many Sovietologists
are too quick to label Gorbachev and Soviet policies as
revisionary. Such a stance discounts the basic premise of
Communism and hence the foundation of the Soviet Union. The Soviet
Union will never conform to the Imperialism as is suggested by
revisionism. The Soviets are giving the impression of a "peace
loving nation" as they define "peace loving" to the point that it
benefits their goals and objectives.
One must also study the capabilities of the Soviet navy not
what the Soviets would like for us to believe. A country cannot
1 2 2
"Soviet naval trends remain 'an enigma'" Jane's Defence
Weekly 28 May 1988, p. 1046.
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be judged by what its leaders say without judging the capabilities
of that country. This analysis of Soviet capabilities does not
support the Soviet claims. The Soviet navy despite Soviet rhetoric
still has and maintains an offensive capability.
Naval exercises, especially those involving surface naval
combatants provide a very attractive avenue for the Kremlin's
declarations of its commitment to arms reductions and consequently
the reduction of East-West tension. Moscow is willing to play
whatever game is necessary in the achievement of its objectives and
if a reduced naval presence does not prove to be the key, Moscow
will opt for another angle. Marshal Akhromeyev, in September
stated "Moscow would place a high priority in future arms control
negotiations on reducing naval forces and sharply limiting their
activities... proposals to NATO include:
- Restructuring missile-carrying submarines to certain areas
of the ocean that would in turn be closed to specialized anti-
submarine warfare vessels,
- Prohibition of missile-carrying surface ships of one country
from approaching another's coast within the range of the
ship's missiles,
- Prohibitions on naval activities in agreed international
sea lanes, straits, shipping areas and fishing zones,
- Prohibition of the deployment of amphibious craft and
landing forces within reach of the other's coast to prevent
surprise attacks,
- Notice of large-scale naval maneuvers with the participation
of foreign observers, much as NATO and Warsaw Pact countries
now do with ground maneuvers; limits on the size and number
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of major naval maneuvers and 1Frhaps inspection of each other's
ships and shore facilities."
Gorbachev may be trying to prove to the world that the Soviet
Union can deal with the West in a responsible manner and earlier
exercises could have been considered too provocative. But the
deployment of American sea-launched cruise missiles could prompt
the Soviet Union to place additional emphasis once again on
developing the ability to engage Western units far from Soviet
territory or it could reinforce the need for bastions.
"The West is being called to work together with the Soviet
Union. It is for the West to decide what kind of a Soviet
Union it wishes to have: a garrison state which staggers from
one crisis to the next or an economically and politicalk A
viable nation in which irreversible change is taking place."
' 4
Reformation of Soviet foreign policy is based on two assumptions.
"It proposes to view the world as a whole and to accept the fact
that security can no longer be maintained by military means alone
but only by means of 'common security between East and West and in
the international arena'". 1 2 5 The Soviet Union has accepted the
views of Clausewitz and Lenin that military means must be
subordinated to political means, if the goal of military-strategic
balance is to be attained. The Kremlin exhibits "a willingness to
123Michael Parks, "Soviets Propose Reducing Risks of Naval
Clash" Los Angeles Times September 6, 1988.
12 4
"Hints Of Major Shifts In Pact Doctrine, Organization"
Frankfurt/Main Frankfurter Allegmeine 4 Jul 87, FBIS-SOV-87-136,
16 Jul 87, p. CC 5.
12 5Ibid.
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experiment with alternative ways of achieving a goal. ''1 2 6 A
substantial relaxation of competition with the United States in the
international arena is advocated. "Just as economic determinants
are finally imposing constraints that should make the Soviet Union
a less formidable military adversary, Gorbachev has already made
the Soviet Union a more daunting competitor."
1 2 7
Budgetary constraints coupled with increased emphasis by
Soviet planners upon the improvement of the navy's capability to
conduct operations close to home is a factor. But increased has
been the use of the navy in conjunction with air force units to
improve the Soviet ability to defend itself against attack by
bombers and cruise missiles. Near-term budgetary constraints is
the frequent explanation and justification for the change in
Gorbachev's efforts to modernize the Soviet industry.
l26Graham T. Allison, Jr., "Testing Gorbachev." Foreign
Affairs. (December 1988), p. 20.
1 2 71bid, p. 18.
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VI. NORDIC MILITARY-POLITICAL SITUATION
A. THE AVOIDANCE OF APPEARING PROVOCATIVE: INSURAMCE OR SUICIDE
FOR THE REGION
Changes in global balance of power and alliance relationships
may be forcing a shift in Western security policy. US Secretary
of State George P. Shultz cited the "...emerging features of global
change as - the rapidity both of technological innovation and the
means to distribute that technology on a global scale,... increasing
economic interdependence and ... the dispersion of political
power."'1 2 8 Authors Taylor and Cole state that "each Nordic nation
is adjusting in its own way to changes in the regional and global
security environment. ,
1 29
The Northern Flank countries of NATO (Denmark, Iceland and
Norway) have a history of political stability and cohesiveness.
Northern flank countries' Soviet threat perceptions have long been
in decline except at the elite and expert levels, yet Denmark and
1 2 8
"U.S.-Soviet Relations in a Changing World, Managing the
Relationship" By George P. Shultz, U.S. Secretary of State,
Delivered before the Henry M. Jackson School of International
Studies, University of Washington, Seattle, Washington, February
5, 1988, Vital Speeches of the Day, Vol. LIV, No. 11, March 15,
1988, p. 322.
1 2 9William J. Taylor, Jr. and Paul M. Cole, ed., Nordic
Defense: Comparative Decision MakinQ, (Lexington, Mass. and
Toronto: D.C. Heath and Company and Lexington Book, 1985), p. 188.
59
Norway have long been considered key penetration points in a
potential NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict.
The term "equidistance" characterizes the attitude of many
people, particularly in the successor generations, in the European
nations and provides insight as to how some people in there nations
view themselves. Many people in these nations see themselves as
equally distant from each superpower. This perception greatly
discounts the East-West struggle. The United States is viewed as
driving the East-West struggle. "Equidistancing" undermines the
basis of the Alliance as it omits its basic deterrent function by
discounting the threat.
Paralleling the attitude of "equidistancing" is the fear of
appearing too provocative to the Soviet Uniun. The Nordic nations
understand the need to maintain good relations with the USSR. The
highest priority is given to avoid antagonizing the "Big Bear".
Thomas Ries in "Soviet Military Strategy and Northern Waters" says
that,
"...the political dimension of (NATO Nordic) security policy,
(incorporates) the equally vital need not to raise regional
tensions vis-a-vis the USSR more than necessary. This dilemma
may continue as the NATO Nordic states have to choose between
maintaining either their military dete{fJnt credibility or
regional good relations with the USSR."
"During the past decade... the Scandinavians have been
subjected to a barrage of Soviet political and military actions
designed to harass or frighten them, generate a sense of
1 3 0Tomas Ries, "Soviet Military Strategy and Northern
Waters", The Soviet Union and Northern Waters, Edited by Clive
Archer. (London and New York: Routledge, 1988) p. 131.
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separateness from the Western Alliance, and condition them to
accept a posture of compliant, pro-Soviet neutrality.,,1 3 1  Past
Soviet military pressure in the North has not been altogether
ineffective. Ineffective by whose determination is the issue. It
has been ineffective for the Soviet Union and counterproductive for
it has pushed the Nordic members of the Alliance closer to NATO and
subsequently strengthening NATO in the North. "Soviet military
presence in the far north has evidenced the response of a greater
military effort in the region by Norway, Iceland, Denmark and their
allies. It has hardened public opinicn to support NATO and remain
skeptical of the USSR.
'f1 3 2
"The line dividing the two military-political blocs passes
through Europe.'" 1 3 3 Advocated by the Soviet Union is ". ..a system
that would heal the military division on a basis of cooperation
and good-neighbourhood (sic) among all European states. Precisely
such a security system is implied by the ever more popular concept
of a 'common European home '',1 34 But the Soviet Union and the Nordic
nations have very different ideas as to what "a common European
1 3 1 Francis J. West Jr., Jacquelyn K. Davis, James E.
Doughtery, Robert J. Hanks and Charles M. Perry, Naval Forces and
Western Security, Special Report 1987, The Atlantic and Western
Security: The Maritime Dimension, Volume 1, p. 28.
1 3 2Thomas Ries, p. 174.
1 3 3
"Soviet Diplomacy Turns to Europe," The Current Digest Of
The Soviet Press, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 29., p. 8.
1 34 Sergei Karaganov, "The Common European Home: The Military
Angle" International Affairs, August 1988, p. 71.
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home" would mean. Both interpretations are correlations of the
changing global balance of power, Secretary Shultz discusses above.
In the North a common security challenge confronts and in some
measure requires a common response from three NATO and two neutral
countries. In addition, the problem in the North has grown
considerably in recent years with the steady build up of Soviet
military capabilities in the Kola Peninsula and nearby areas.
Complicating the problem is the perceived enhancement to both sides
of the Norwegian and Barents Seas in any conflict, and the more
aggressive actions of the Soviets in probing Norwegian and Swedish
waters.
These nations are economically sound and have enjoyed a
relatively high standard of living. The North has enjoyed a
peaceful, almost quiet existence with ". ..the North region (having)
always been a separate and distinct part of Europe. ,135 Soviet
proponents state that,
The West is being called upon to work together with the Soviet
Union. It is for the West to decide what kind of a Soviet
Union it wishes to have: a garrison state which staggers from
one crisis to the next or an economically and political] 6
viable nation in which irreversible change is taking place."
The Nordic definition is underscored by the fear of appearing too
provocative to the Soviet Union, its neighboring superpower.
"The Danish and Norwegian governments rely on military
preparedness to deter the Soviets, yet take measures to
demonstrate peaceful intent and nonprovocation. The purpose
1 35 Taylor, Cole, p. 191.
1 3 6
"Hints Of Major Shifts In Pact Doctrine, Organization",
Frankfurt/Main Frankfurter Allegme ne, in German, 4 Jul 87, p. 5,
FBIS-SOV 16 Jul 87, p. CC 5.
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of this approach is to create stability and peace at the
lowest possible level of military pr .gredness and reduce
political tension in northern Europe."
Moscow and Washington view this as contradictory and want the
Nordic nations to take a more assertive stance in the demonstration
of their support for the East or the West. If the Nordic nations
continue to be reluctant to make a definitive stance against one
of the superpowers, the United States will seek to maintain the
status quo in the region for current Nordic sentiment favors the
West. The Soviet Union would obviously favor a Nordic preference
for the East. "The Soviet Union is not a status quo power - and
cannot be so according to its own image of itself. For the ruling
class of the nomenklatura international politics as all other
politics, consists of a perpetual struggle.",
1 3 8
Arne Brundtland argues that the Nordic reluctance is tied to
the Nordic perception of the use of military force in resolving a
political situation. Brundtland states,
"The security challenge to the five Nordic states does not
emanate from within the region. The use of military force to
solve political problems among the Nordic states in nearly
inconceivable. The prime security problems of the Nordic
countries result from the differences between the East and the
West and ,i±$ Nordic region's strategic importance in this
struggle."
1 3 7Arne Brundtland, "The Context of Security in Northern
Europe" Northern Europe: Security Issues for the 1990's. Edited by
Paul M. Cole and Douglas M. Hart, (Boulder and London: Westview
Press and CSIS, Georgetown University, 1986), pp. 10-11.
1 3 8 BentJensen, "The Soviet Union And Scandinavia: Status Quo
Or Revision - 'Nordic Balance' Or "Nordic Peace Zone'?" Nordic
Journal of Scandinavian Affairs, Volume 4:1 (1987), p. 9.
1 3 9 Brundtland, p. 11.
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One cannot fault the Nordic nations for their diffidence in dealing
with the superpowers for it is likely that should conflict ensue
between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, it is likely to be fought on
Nordic soil. When studying the Nordic NWFZ proposal one must
remember that,
S...the greatest nuclear presence in Northern Europe can be
found at the Soviet bases on the Kola peninsula, though
primarily strategic and not specifically directed against the
Nordic countries. Nevertheless, these countries (Nordic
nations) feel uncomfortable about having the weapons on their
doorstep, especially when military resources used to defend
Soviet strategic weapons can be used against their
territory.,
,14 0
This fact can not but alter Scandinavia's perceptions of the zone.
It is probably the single most important factor affecting Nordic
interpretation. The Nordic nations are at disadvantage when
dealing with the Soviet Union due to implicit differences of the
two societies; the Nordic nations are open societies whereas the
Soviet Union is a closed society. As such, the Soviets do not
practice open communication and dialogue with the Nordic countries
in military matters. "The Soviet policy of concealment
is counterproductive, as it adds to the perception of Soviet
expansionism and Nordic vulnerability.",
1 4 1
Nordic leaders point out that shared security goals equate to
shared perceptions. "The Nordic balance is best conceptualized as
a carefully orchestrated zone within which the inherent tensions
14 0Clive Archer, "Russia's Arctic Dimension" World Today,
vol. 44, no. 3, March, 1988, pp. 47-48.
14 1 Brundtland, p. 11.
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born out of mutual superpower hostilities and capabilities are to
be accentuated."1 4 2  These leaders want a voice in security
decisions regarding their nations and do not want to be pawns
between the superpowers. Nordic security perceptions are not
"mirror images" of the superpowers nor will the Nordic leaders
allow them to be. The North leaders seek more than "buffer zone
status" for their nations.
The Soviet Union has not altered its perception of Nordic
security policies and the "Nordic balance,"
"...the fundamental view taken of the security policies of
the Nordic countries is still the same today under Gorbachev
as it was just short of forty years ago under Stalin as well
as under Chruseev (sic) and Breznev (sic). Under pressure
from 'the forces of imperialism', by mistake or misjudgement
(sic), some of the Nordic countries have ended up in the
aggressive NATO bloc, while Sweden chose a West-oriented and
therefore not quite correct policy of neutrality. Only
Finland chose the right course. And this regrettable state
of affairs in Scandinavia must be altered the sooner thebetter. ,,-4 -
It would then appear that Moscow has not regarded Denmark's,
Iceland's and Norway's membership in NATO as a stabilizing factor
in the Nordic pattern of security policy. "None of the Soviet
leaders since th, late 1940s have ever accepted the 'Nordic balance
but have constantly pressed for the creation of a 'permanent peace
zone.'",1 4 4 Finland is the only Nordic country which is regarded -
under the present circumstances - as having an acceptable status
1 4 2 Taylor, Cole, p. xx.
1 4 3 Bent Jensen, p. 11.
144Ibid., p. 11.
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vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. ''1 4 5 Finland is bound by a "friendship
treaty" with the Soviet Union and consequently has been reduced to
a neutralized status.
Soviet writers, such as Sergei Karaganov contend that the
"balance of forces" has already shifted in favor of the Soviet
Union. He states that,
"In view of most West European leaders, the balance of forces
in Europe has shifted in favour (sic) of the Soviet Union.
They tend to judge us (the Soviets) by their own standard, or
rather, that of the United States, which is prone to make
high-handed use of a favourable (sic) balance of forces in
this or that region for putting pressure or even aggression
(in the 1980s, for instance, there was Lebanon, Libya,
Nicaragua, Grenada). Hence the conclusion: in order to
prevent the TTSSR from acting in a similar way, one should
somehow compensate 1 r the shift in the balance of power in
its favour (sic). ''I
Mr. Karaganov is correct in his assessment of Western mirror-
imaging but for him to conclude that the majority of Western
European leaders realize that the "balance of forces" has shifted
in favor of the Soviet Union is inaccurate.
R. Ekeus in his paper "How to proceed towards a Nordic nuclear
weapon-free zone" cites as a prerequisite,
"The three essential components in the process of establishing
a nuclear weapon-free zone are: (a) a positive decision (i.e.,
will) in each of the countries concerned; (b) tentative
agreement between the countries; and (c) accommodation of J
nuclear weapon powers, (primarily the two great powers) ."
14 51bid.
1 4 6 Karaganov, p. 76.
147R. Ekeus, "How to proceed towards a Nordic nuclear weapon-
free zone" in Nuclear DisenQagement in Europe, edited by Sverre
Lodgaard and Marek Thee, (london and New York: Taylor & Francis,
1983), p. 239.
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But not all Nordic nations are in agreement regarding the
prerequisites or objectives of a Nordic NWFZ. Nordic perceptions
of a NWFZ are products of the political climates of the individual
Nordic nations. Each nation seeks the enhancement of its own
national security interests. Nordic national security is not a
collective effort but one that does however require a common vision
amongst the Nordic nations,
"Denmark has always had a dual foreign policy orientation:
toward the Nordic states, a region in which denmark was often
the dominant power; and toward the continental European states
with which Denmark, in the past, formed various alliances.
Norway has had a dual orientation toward the Nordic states on
the one hand and toward the sea or, more specifica2'y, toward
Great Britain and other dominant sea powers on the other hand.
Iceland is distantly located and its national interests have
always been defined by its dominate industry, fisheries.
Finland has had a dual orientation as well. Although the
Finns share the same fundamental values and traditions of
Scandinavia in general .... (and) Sweden's convenient geographic
location partly accounts its monistic foreign policy since
the time of Napoleon...
As previously stated, the Nordic nations do not want to be pawns
between the superpowers, but this is contradicted when one
considers that "The dominant problem is obviously the great powers'
attitude. If an emphatically negative stand is taken by one of the
great powers, the zone project is doomed to failure.",1 4 9  The
United States and NATO must tactfully guide Scandinavia in order
for the United States to retain its nuclear superiority in the
region. But to be successful, US and NATO leaders must encourage
1 4 8 Taylor, Cole, p. 190.
1 4 9 R. Ekeus, p. 239.
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Scandinavian leaders in a manner that will allow these leaders to
accept credit for retention of the American nuclear guarantee.
Scandinavia does not want to be a pawn for either superpower and
too much persuasion on the part of either superpower would be
enough to dissuade Scandinavia.
Nordic nations consider maintenance of the status quo
essential for a 'common European home.' The irony is that a nation
that "straddles the fence" cannot hope for real autonomy in its
national security affairs. Such a nation can only be seen as a
potential player in a superpower conflict and nothing more than a
pawn. This is specifically what the Nordic nations do not want.
But until the Nordic nations take a definite stand on the NWFZ
issue, Scandinavia will be nothing more than a "Northern pawn" in
the eyes of the superpowers.
Scandinavian national security or preservation of a way of
life acceptable to the people of Scandinavia is paramount. It
should be compatible with the needs and legitimate aspirations of
others. It includes freedom from attack or coercion, freedom from
internal subversion and freedom from erosion of the political,
economic and social values which are essential to the quality of
life in Scandinavia. A Nordic NWFZ would circumvent the
Scandinavian national security interests mentioned above, leaving
Scandinavia with little say in their national security.
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VII. DIFFERENCES IN WESTERN INTERPRETATIONS FOR A NORDIC NWFZ
Despite Soviet advocacy for the establishment of a Nordic NWFZ
there lacks a concrete definition by the Kremlin on what said zone
would mean for the Soviet Union. The Soviet proposal does not
address the crucial questions of: inclusion of Soviet territory in
a Nordic zone; nuclear weapons targeted on the region from outside
the zone; verifiability; or how geographic asymmetries and existing
security arrangements would be taken into account in such a zone.
"It has never been explicitly stated what the Soviets would be
willing to offer in return for a Nordic nuclear free zone except
a statement by Leonid Brezhnev in 1981 that the Soviet Union would
be willing 'to undertake certain measures' on its own territory."
150
However, the Nordic nations have their own interpretations of what
a Nordic NWFZ would mean for them. Their definition is not so
ambiguous.
As previously stated, other Scandinavian nations do not have
nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union wants a commitment to no nuclear
weapons in the future. The principal Nordic nations of Denmark,
Sweden, Norway and Finland "...already have no nuclear weapons on
their territory and, as signatories to the Nonproliferation Treaty,
have foregone their right to develop and deploy such weapons...
15 0Niels Haagerup, "Scandinavian NATO Without Nuclear
Weapons" The Washington Quarterly, Winter 1986, p. 11.
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(the Kremlin seeks to) confirm this de facto nuclear-free
situation by formal arrangement.",1
51
Soviet military doctrine professes a strictly defensive
character. The Kremlin supports this. "There is general agreement
in Moscow that the defensive nature of Soviet military-political
goals is demonstrated by the USSR's willingness both to prevent war
between the East and the West and to defend the Socialist community
against Aggression should war break out."'152 Gorbachev's response
to the West regarding such "conjectures from abroad"153 follows,
"I state in no uncertain terms: We are not doing and will not
do anything over and above what meets the minimum requirements
of our defense and the protection of our friends and allies,
especially in view of American W itary activities not far
from our own and their borders." (Emphasis added)
It is apparent that "... this defensive orientation does not imply
the kind of military restraint that Western countries are hoping
for. It is continually emphasized that the USSR must strengthen
its military capabilities and that the defense of Socialist
151 Richard Bitzinger, "Nordic Nuclear-Weapons-Free
Zones:Prospects and Problems" Rand P-7356, August 1987, p. 1.
152Gerhard Wettig, "Has Soviet Military Doctrine Changed?"
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty RL465/87, November 20, 1987, p. 2.
153Ibid
.
154Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Delivered at
the Presentation of the Order of Lenin, Vladivostok, USSR, July 28,
1986, "Gorbachev Accents Soviet Role in Asia" The Current Digest
Of The Soviet Press, Volume XXXVIII, No. 30, August 27, 1986, p.
4.
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achievements against the encroachments of imperialism can only be
guaranteed by a high level of military preparedness."
15 5
A. US REACTION AND COMMENTARY
"The Soviet Union's pledge (of 15 June 1982) that Moscow won't
be the first to use nuclear weapons was dismissed by Reagan
administration officials as propaganda aimed at wooing Western
Europe." 156 If this is true, wouldn't the Nordic NWFZ as envisioned
by the Soviets be another propaganda attempt to woo Western Europe?
Moscow continually portrays the United States as the obstacle
to the establishment of NWFZs. The United States has expressly
opposed the zone, reasoning that it would complicate arms control
negotiations and damage NATO cooperation. But the United States
supports the creation of NWFZs that are workable, that
realistically take into account existing security arrangements, and
that truly enhance the security of a region. Sovietologists state
that "in contrast to the USSR, the USA has taken great care in
dealing with the nuclear issue.",157This is surprising because
research has shown that the US response regarding the Nordic NWFZ,
until recently, to be nebulous, a feature that the Soviets will no
155Wettig, p. 2.
156Karen Elliott House, "Soviet Pledge on Atomic Bomb Use
Dismissed by U.S. as a Propaganda Ploy," Wall Street Journal, 16
June 1982, p. 2.
157Nigel de Lee, "Iceland: Unarmed Ally" Northern Waters:
Security and Resource Issues. Edited by Clive Archer and David
Schrivener. (London and Sydney: Croom Helm, 1986), p. 199.
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doubt use to their advantage. 1 5 8 As stated earlier, the Soviet
proposal fails to address the crucial issues of a Nordic NWFZ.
Since these issues have not been addressed by the Soviets, it is
unlikely that they will be issues of compromise for the Soviets.
"The Soviet have years of experience with deception programs
related to arms control agreements.",
1 59
Even in the face of this Soviet challenge, "The three chief
tenets of NATO have never been in doubt: a common purpose, a common
strategy and a common defense. ,160 Oliver Wright, Former
Ambassador of Great Britain to the United States, stated:
"Europe remains of central importance to America because this
where the adversary superpower is present in its greatest
strength. Europe is where Russia is. And Western Europe is
where there is the greatest concentration of freedo oving
people outside the United States, over 300 million."
'
His statement puts in basic terms the need for cortinued American
military presence in the region in both conventional and nuclear
terms. Even if the cultural tie is discounted, the Soviets are
there, the region is critical to US interests. "The line dividing
1 5 8 President Bush specifically rejected NWFZs in December,
1989.
1 5 9Professor Kerry M. Kartchner, Soviet Compliance With A
Future START AQreement, Working Papers in International Studies,
1-89-9, The Hoover Institution, Stanford University, March 1989,
p. 35.
1 6 0 Bertram, p. 943.
1 6 1
"Current Challenges to the Special Relationship: U.S. And
Our European Allies" Oliver Wright, Former Ambassador of Great
Britain to the United States, Delivered to the Town Hall of
California, on his "Farewell Tour", Los Angeles, California, May
20, 1986, Vital Speeches of the Day, p. 579.
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i -A
the two military-political blocs passes through Europe."'1 6 2  To
deny this as the motivation, of not only the American presence in
Western Europe, but continued Allied support of the American
commitment to freedom for the West, would be naive.
Indications are that the world may be entering a post-nuclear
era. "Nuclear weapons will no longer be seen as an option for
defending Europe against a conventional attack. And further
reduccions or elimination of nuclear arms through agreement with
the USSR may even become dangerous, if the balance of conventional
forces remains unfavorable to the West.",1 6 3 It is doubtful nuclear
weapons fail would cease to be viable options for defense of one's
homeland for no other reason than "...that the two sides (US and
USSR) are compelled to maintain a rough balance in strategic
weapons for political reasons, even if the details are no longer
crucial. ,,164
1 6 2
"Soviet Diplomacy Turns to Europe" The Current Digest Of
The Soviet Press, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 29., p. 8.
1 6 3William G. Hyland, "Setting Global Priorities" Foreign
Policy, Number 73, Winter 1988-1989, p. 26.
1 6 4 Hyland, p. 27.
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HOW NORDIC NWFZ PROPOSALS ARE PERCEIVED BY DENMARK, FINLAND,
IELAND, NORWAY AND SWEDEN
"The Nordic policy of the Soviet Union is one link in the
whole of Soviet foreign policy. The Nordic countries are to
be drawn away from the influence of imperialism, away from
the 'camp of war' and over into a 'zone of peace' for one day
in the fu:ure to be incorporated in the 'camp of peace'. In
this process Finland has gone the furtherest (sic) ar~d.s thus
held up as a model for the other Nordic countries."
' u
Each of the Scandinavian cou-tries had individually decided
not to acquire nuclear weapons or to permit stationing them on its
soil in peacetime. Nevertheless, proposals for official, mutual
recognition of this status, perhaps including the Soviet Union and
the Baitic, have been discussed since 1959, when Khrushchev said
:hat the Soviet Union supports the idea of setting up a rocket and
atom free zone in the Scandinavian peninsula and the Baltic area.
Other countries have made similar propisals, but negotiations
between countries on the idea have never taken place. The Soviet
Union has repeatedly urged the creation of the zone, adding a
willingress for some measures that will apply to Soviet territory.
S... Icelandic ministers have been careful to note that no such
scheme would work unless it includes Soviet bases on the Kola
ieninsula. ''1 6 6 When all concerned governments have expressed
1 6 5 BentJenser, "The Soviet U~ion and Scandinavia: Status Quo
or Revision - Nordic Balance' or 'Nordic Peace Zone'?" Nordic
Journal of Scandinavian Affairs, Vc'uiLce 4:1 (1987), p. 10.
166de Lee, p. 199.
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1m
interest in the Nordic NWFZ, the Soviet Union will be ready to take
part in the negotiations. An easy stance to take when one
considers the varying interpretations of a Nordic N WFZ found
amongst the Scandinavian nations. "In no case have NWFZs managed
to gain the support of all the states of a region or all of the
eligible external powers. ,167 The Nordic NWFZ is not an exception.
DENMARK. Denmark wants to be more than just a pawn between the
superpowers in the nuclear warfare debate. Ironically, this is a
self-imposed status as Denmark does not have nuclear weapons nor
does not it allow the peacetime stationing of nuclear weapons on
its soil. It expects ships carrying nuclear weapons not to visit
its harbors and expects the United States to respect the Danish
policy. The Social Democrats oppose unilateral declaration of
Denmark as a nuclear-free zone and believe that the Kola peninsula
and the Baltic should be included. The parties further to the left
support a unilateral declaration.
Moscow considers Denmark politically and militarily critical
to the NATO coalition. Militarily, Denmark stands at the
crossroads of naval and air communication links between central
and northern Europe and between the Baltic Sea and -he Atlantic
Ocean. "NATO strategists set aside a key role for Denmark in plans
to seal off the Baltic Strait zone linking Continental Europe and
16 7 Purver, p. 12.
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Scandinavia. ,1 68 Politically, as one of the smaller members of the
coalition and a "front-line" state, it constitutes the principal
focus for the Soviet hopes to rapidly unravel the NATO coalition.
"If Denmark could be convinced to opt out of a NATO/Warsaw Pact
conflict, other smaller states in the Alliance might be persuaded
to do the same.",1 6 9 A debate is ongoing within Denmark regarding
its role in NATO:
"Scholars and analysts have raised the question of whether
Denmark can or should play a role in a superpower conflict.
A growing voice in Denmark tends to describe Denmark as a
nation caught between the United States and the Sonat Union,
with little to say in the outcome of a conflict.'
"The structure of Danish defense expenditures is such that a
substantially higher proportion of it is spent abroad than is the
case for most other members of the Alliance. This is because
Denmark produces virtually no armaments and fuel for its armed
forces.",1 7 1 Denmark's reliance on other nations for the production
of its defense assets makes it vulnerable. "Denmark has become the
focus - indeed, for some, the symbol - of 'under performance' of
Alliance responsibilities... "1 7 2 This label appeals to the Kremlin,
1 6 8
"Nonnuclear Zones: Important Factor of European Security"
18010410B Moscow Zarubezhnoye Voyennoye Obozreniye in Russian, No.
5, May 88, (signed to press 5 May 88) pp.9-12., JPRS-TAC-88-041,
2 November 1988, p. 10.
1 6 9 Donnelly and Petersen, p. 1047.
17 0 Paul M. Cole, "The Northern Balance, Changing Realities in
Defending Northern Europe" Defense & Foreign Affairs, December
1986, p. 23.
17 1Heisler, p. 86.
17 2 Ibid., p. 65.
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as it signals a potentially weak link in the Alliance chain. This
is not so and it must remain not so, especially in light of the
importance the Soviets have given to the establishment of the
Baltic as a "closed sea." (See Chapter 7 for a more in-depth
discussion of this issue.) NATO must counter Danish uncertainty
regarding the Alliance and not allow the Kremlin more of an
advantage in the Baltic than it already has. Soviet pressures have
increased in Danish territorial waters and airspace thus forcing
some to question Denmark's support of NATO. In summary, Denmark
is the only Nordic country belonging to the European Community.
It is unlikely that the Danish government would do anything to
endanger its NATO membership. The Danish government seems to favor
a broader European zone or at least one which includes sea areas
and adjacent territories. Denmark is not alone in this sentiment.
Both Norwegian and Danish Social Democrats support a Nordic NWFZ,
...contingent upon the approval of the Atlantic alliance and
fully compatible with NATO membership. Furthermore, agreement
on the part of both superpowers to provide negative security
guarantees for the zone would be essential. Finally, Danish
and Norwegian advocates of an NNFZ (Nordic NWFZ) insist that
any such zone must somehow also affect Soviet nuclear weapons
in adjacent territories (particularly those deployed in the
Baltic, o 1° 73the Kola and in the Leningrad Military
District)."
FINLAND. Finland is the most zealous of the Nordic nations in its
support of a Nordic NWFZ and ". ..has been the most consistent in
1 7 3 Bitzinger, Competing Security Doctrines And A Nordic
Nuclear-Free Zone", p. 6.
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its backing of a Nordic NWFZ. ''1 7 4 This is a result of its close
proximity to the Soviet Union and the special relationship that it
maintains with its superpower neighbor. "Finland is a neutral
country which exists in the shadow of Soviet power."1 7 5 Finland
agreed in its Peace Treaty with Britain, the Soviet Union and other
nations (Treaty of Paris 1947) not to acquire nuclear weapons. It
would refuse to accept nuclear weapons on behalf of other
countries. Finland believes that a Nordic NWFZ should permit each
nation to define its own security concerns and take them fully into
account. The Nordic countries should receive assurances that
nuclear weapons would not be used against them under any
circumstances. Finland advocates participation of the leading
powers in the early stages. It proposes that the Nordic countries
together with the great powers seek a separate treaty arrangement
covering them which would isolate them from the effects of nuclear
strategy and nuclear weapons technology. The starting point should
be a Nordic NWFZ.
The zone should permit each country to define its own security
concerns and take them fully into account. A Nordic NWFZ should
only include the maritime territorial waters. Inclusion of other
maritime areas would be desirable if arrangements were made outside
the treaty itself; an agreement on the Baltic would involve many
countries outside the Nordic region. The treaty itself should only
1 7 4 Bitzinger, Competing Security Doctrines And A Nordic
Nuclear-Free Zone", p. 4.
1 7 5Taylor, Cole, p. xv.
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include the Nordic countries. Some limitation by the big powers
on deployment of nuclear weapons near the zone would be helpful,
but any such limit should be balanced.
ICELAND. Iceland does not have a military complex but is a member
of NATO and has a US base at Keflavik, where nuclear weapons may
be stored in time of war. However, Iceland under no circumstances
will accept nuclear weapons in times of peace. Should
circumstances arise in the time of crisis or war, nuclear weapons
could be stationed only with the express approval of the
government.
Iceland takes the most extreme stance of the Nordic nations
in the Nordic NWFZ issue. Its "rational consideration of national
security... is prevented by an intense emotional horror of all
things nuclear, and a refusal to admit that the safety of the
republic might depend upon nuclear weapons. ',176 This inability to
consider nuclear weaponry as a viable means of defense precludes
any credible input by the Icelandic government regarding the
establishment of a Nordic NWFZ. Its view is a prejudiced one in
which the response is consistently predictable - no nuclear
weapons. Iceland wants to take part in the discussions of a Nordic
NWFZ but believes that it should not be done unilaterally but only
as part of a broader European context. This allows Iceland to "put
the blame" on the other Nordic Alliance members and still claim a
"no-nuke posture. Icelanders neither support nuclear defense nor
17 6de Lee, p. 193.
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conventional defense. They naively perceive that no defense is the
best defense. Particularly frightening to Icelanders is an
alliance to a nuclear superpower, "...conventional defense is
irrelevant because any war would rapidly escalate to full nuclear
exchange; so, alliance to a nuclear power may well guarantee
destruction rather than security.",
1 7 7
S...Iceland's role in Soviet military strategy is scenario
dependent.",17 8 As such its defensive structure must be able to
react to crisis from the Soviets. "Icelanders demonstrate a
general awareness of the fact that the Soviet navy has expanded in
recent years and that Iceland's geography makes it strategically
important to NATO and to the Soviets as well. This awareness is
not accompanied by any real sense of urgency concerning Icelandic
security."'17 9  Iceland seeks "...mass support for the status
quo... 1180 But what does that mean? In this changing world,
continuation of the status quo may be detrimental. Icelandic
sources of energy are not threatened but "some Icelanders fear threy
may attract multi-national concerns whose activities will damage
1 7 7 Ibid., p. 193.
1 7 8 PhillipA. Petersen, "Iceland in Soviet Military Strategy"
Iceland NATO and Security in the Norwegian Sea (Reykjavik, Iceland:
Boston Foreign Affairs Group and the Icelandic Association for
Western Cooperation, 12-13 March 1987), p. 7.
17 9 Taylor, Cole, p. xvii.
18 0Ibid., p. 199.
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the environment and way of life. ''18 1 Ironically, it is because of
the American nuclear guarantee that Iceland is able to maintain its
level of status quo. Icelanders have failed to grasp the strategic
importance of the American nuclear guarantee in the Arctic. It is
unlikely that Iceland will, but as long as the United States
maintains military installations there, Icelandic considerations
must be incorporated in the Nordic NWFZ debate.
NORWAY. "Norway is, in may respects, Western Europe's maritime
superpower. Norway controls the largest national ocean area in
Europe...,,182 Norway, a member of NATO, explicitly stated in a
Defense White Paper in 1961 that the government does not allow
stockpiling of nuclear warheads on Norwegian territory in
peacetime. "Short of being able to bring about Norwegian
neutrality, the Soviet government very much approves of Norway's
refusal to have nuclear weapons stationed on her soil in peacetime.
To consolidate and build on this favourable (sic) of Norwegian (and
Danish) policy, the Soviet Union has looked with considerable
favour (sic) on Finnish proposals for a Nordic nuclear-free
zone.",1 8 3 But, "the Soviet Union will not accept Norwegian demands
for limitations on the numbers of nuclear and conventional weapons
181de Lee, p. 199.
18 2 Baard Bredrup Knudsen, "Norway: Security Dilemmas and
Current Issues," Evolving European Defense Policies. Edited by
Catherine M. Kelleher and Gale A. Mattox. D.C. Heath and
Company/Lexington, Ma./Toronto: Lexington Books, 1987), p. 296.
183Brenchley, p. 13.
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on the Kola Peninsula, which are a condition for a nuclear-free
zone in the area. On the other hand, the Soviet Union is prepared
to hold talks on a nuclear-free Baltic.
''184
Interestingly, ships with nuclear weapons may call in ports
for brief periods but Norway will not permit the peacetime
stationing of foreign forces on its territory. Likewise, the
storage or stationing of nuclear and chemical weapons is
prohibited. Norway contends that it will base its defense upon
conventional defense. "It must continue to be a stipulation that
foreign warships entering Norwegian ports not carry nuclear
weapons. ,,185
The Norwegian goal is the banning of the use of nuclear
weapons on or against Norwegian territory. As previously stated,
Norway will work toward establishment of a Nordic NWFZ as part of
efforts to reduce nuclear weapons in a larger European context.
Even a zone which included the Baltic and parts of the Soviet Union
would not be large enough to reduce the risk of a nuclear attack
on the Nordic nations.
The Norwegian Labor Party has been more enthusiastic about
the zone, but said it should be considered in a wider context, for
example, in connection with the establishment of a zone in Central
184
"SwedishPaper Reviews Komissarov Baltic Article" PM271946
Stockholm Dagens Nyheter in Swedish, 20 Feb 86, p. 17, Foreign
Media, 21 March 1986. p. .
185
"Labor Party Reaffirms Ban On Nuclear-Armed Warships"
PM271245 Oslo Aftenposten in Norwegian 24 Feb 86, p. 3, Foreign
Media, 21 March 1986, p. 6.
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Europe. A nuclear-weapon-free regime should also impose
limitations on the nuclear powers' freedom of action. Nuclear
weapons are found in areas adjacent to the four countries.
Spitsbergen, territory of Norway, is covered under an
international treaty which permits signatories equal right to
economic exploitation. "The land frontier between Norway and the
Soviet Union is the only NATO-USSR frontier in Europe (the only
other is in Asia Minor, in Eastern Turkey). 186 It forbids
installations and the permanent stationing of military personnel.
Norwegian naval vessels visit the territory from time to time,
eliciting a protest from the Soviet Union.
"Norway's security is based upon several interrelated
policies. The most important of these is membership in the
North Atlantic Alliance. This, like neutrality for Sweden,
is the cornerstone of Norwegian security.''
Norway must not allow itself to fall victim to a false sense of
security in its relationship with the Soviet Union for,
"There seems to be no reason to predict any sudden worsening
in the Soviet Government's attitude toward Norway. Patience
is one of the Kremlin's characteristics, based on the belief
that history is on its side and that, given time its
objectives are destined to be achieved. Nevertheless, it is
clear that there are a number of changes in Norway's situation
and policies which would be welcomed in Moscow and for which
Soviet pM sure will therefore be exerted whenever opportunity
offers."
1 8 6 Frank Brenchley, "Norway and her Soviet Neighbour (sic):
NATO's Arctic Frontier," Conflict Studies, (London: The Institute
for the Study of Conflict, Number 134, 1982), p. 2.
18 7Taylor, Cole, p. xvii.
1 8 8 Brenchley, p. 12.
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Norway's insistence that the Nordic NWFZ must incorporate a broader
European context is not likely to waiver as long it remains firmly
entrenched in NATO.
SWEDEN. "Since Peter's time, history has recorded a slow but
steady increase of Russian and then Soviet power in the Baltic.
The result over the past two decades has been that Swedish
territorial integrity has been steadily and increasingly violated,
posing a tremendous dilemma for this neutral nation which
participated in its last war in 1813.,189
Sweden undertook not to manufacture or procure nuclear weapons
in 1968. "They (the Soviets) appreciat(e) Swedish initiatives to
preserve detente and achieve disarmament, not least the advocacy
of nuclear weapons-free zones in Northern and Central Europe."'1 9 0
It pursued nuclear weapon research from 1952 to at least 1957, and
possibly 1972. The government favors a zone which would include
the Baltic and a limit on weapons in the Soviet Union aimed at the
Nordic region. But the zone's international legal details should
not be worked out until all the Nordic countries consider the idea
realistic.
The government favors a zone which would include the Baltic
and an attenuation arrangements agreement on weapons in the Soviet
Union aimed at the Nordic region. But the zone's international
details should not be worked out until all Nordic countries
1 89
"Sweden's Troubled Waters" Defense & ForeiQn Affairs,
December 1985, pp 9-10.
1 9 0 Bent Jensen, p. 18.
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consider the idea realistic. Sweden has done internal work on the
zone. A Nordic NWFZ must provide equal security guarantees for all
of the internal nations. Sweden ". ..reject(s) the idea of
differential guarantees for different members of the zone, that
would see the United States guaranteeing the nuclear-free status
of Norway and Denmark and the Soviet Union that of
Finland... (furtherrore) Sweden has ruled out any kind of positive
security guarantee (an undertaking to come to the aid of a
threatened state) as being incompatible with its neutral status."'1 9 1
Neutral Sweden has become more firmly committed to defend
Swedish territory from Warsaw Pact encroachments. Sweden
recognizes the insurmountable odds with which it is dealing.
"Sweden's dilemma is a difficult one.. .how can a small, even vital
nation like Sweden stand up to the Soviet Union and its military
strength?" 1 9 2  A Nordic NWFZ would provide Sweden with the
strategic might to defend its territory.
The Nordic nations as a whole are pacifying the superpowers
by signalling that they are amenable to a Nordic NWFZ. The Nordic
NWFZ proposal has not progressed past the debate stage and the
Nordic nations are to blame. "The debate over the linkage of a
Nordic NWFZ to a broader European arrangement is not so much a
dispute among ardent proponents of the zone, as it is between those
proponents and others deliberately seeking to delay, if not torpedo
1 9 1purver, p. 32.
1 9 2
"Sweden's Troubled Waters" Defense & Foreign Affairs,
December 1985, p. 38.
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altogether, the very notion of an independent zone."'19 3 To take a
definitive stance for any of the nations past the alignment of
Denmark and Norway with NATO could prove to be suicidal. The North
cannot afford to offend either of the superpowers. "As for the
United States' Arctic allies, for them to completely sever their
connection with the nuclear weapons infrastructure of their
superpower patron, given the dual- or multi-purpose nature of so
much of the technology and facilities concerned, would be
equivalent to cutting all of their defence (sic) links and
substituting a policy of nonalignment for one of alliance."'1 9 4
Ironically, both superpowers cannot offend the Nordic nations. The
strategic security of both superpowers are too firmly entrenched
in the North. Herein lies the dilemma of the Nordic NWFZ. T h e
strategic ramifications of the zone must be considered.
S..where the outer f ,.ram..wo.. rk of the 'Nordic balance' still
exists but where the reality behind the facade is quite
another matter. Soviet propaganda for a nuclear-free zone
can be an illustration of such a situation. Here too the
process is perhaps in the short term as important as the final
aim. Denmark and Norway can continue to be members of NATO,
but the situation will internally be characterized by
an enervating political struggle and outwardly by a95
uncertainty as to the credibility of the alliance."
NATO rests it strategy for defense on the North on clear options,
and the Nordic NWFZ would diminish the options available to NATO
for defense of the region. Touted by the Soviets as a CBM and a
1 9 3 Purver, p. 34.
1 9 4 Purver, p. 50.
1 9 5 Bent Jensen, p. 13.
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means of lowering military tensions in northern Europe, the Soviet
Union stands to be the only benefactor in a Nordic NWFZ, a Soviet
professed "bastion of peace."
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VIII. ANALYSIS OF STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS FOR WESTERN
SECURITY
Limiting the cooperation between the Nordic nations as well as
the cooperation between the Nordic nations and other NATO nations,
particularly the United States is a prime goal for the Kremlin.
The dismantling of NATO is another peacetime goal of the Soviets.
"The Soviets would presumably value most highly a dispute dividing
the United States and its allies in Western Europe.",1 9 6 But the
primary objective of the Soviet Union is the elimination of the
American nuclear guarantee. This is the motivation for the Soviet
proposal for the establishment of a Nordic NWFZ. It has been
manifested in several forms from pleas in official statements to
linkage to other issues such as regional security. Should the
Soviet Union be able to prove the United States unreliable as a
guarantor of regional security, it could prove through "linkage"
that the United States is unreliable as a guarantor of peace. The
Afghanistan War has been used for this purpose. The Soviet Union
contends that only through its commitment to peace and stability
was an end put to the war. Moscow points to the United States
continuance to supply the rebels with weapons via Pakistan. Moscow
contends that as long as the United States still continues to
supply arms so to it must to defend its interest in the region.
19 6David S. Yost, "Soviet Aims in Europe", p. 75.
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Soviet wartime objectives include:
Operation and protection of its SSBN force,
1. Interdiction of Strategic Lines of Communication (SLOCs)
across the Atlantic Ocean,
2. Carry out advances against the key geographic areas of
Northern Norway, Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK)-
Norway Line and the Baltic Straits in conjunction with
advance on Northern Front while avoiding the Central Front,
3. Protection and control of the Central Front is anticipated
as "Upwards of 60% of the yard and docking facilities
necessary for Warsaw Pact shipbuilding and repair, and a
great deal of the training and trials facilit,9, are still
to be found along the shores of the Baltic."
Moscow anticipates that both sides would be striving to destroy
each other's nuclear capability during the conventional phase of
a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict. The Soviet Union expects to
neutralize NATO forces via conventional means without resorting to
nuclear weapons. This keeps the war short and ties in with the
Soviet preference of a short war versus a long, protracted
conflict. The basic objective is to win the conflict while
avoiding the operational use of nuclear weapons. Warsaw Pact
conventional forces hold a preponderance over NATO conventional
forces. Enviable is the lead in manpower and proximity that the
Warsaw Pact holds. Proximity of the Warsaw Pact ensures the Soviet
Union conventional forces of having the competitive advantage. It
has been estimated that for the United States naval forces to
respond to a Warsaw Pact offensive in Europe would require a
minimum of 7 - 10 days, providing the assets are available. This
1 9 7 Bjarne Fr. Lindhardt, Allied Command Baltic Approaches - a
Survey, p. 4.
89
theory assumes a cold start out of the Eastern seaboard of the
United States.
The chief stumbling block to the creation of a Nordic NWFZ is
the strategic significance of the region for both superpowers,
...the Soviet Union necessarily relies to a critical degree
on its Arctic territories for the basing of the most secure
element of its nuclear retaliatory force, its ballistic
missile submarines. It would be in the interests of neither
the Soviet Union nor the West to compromise the relative
invulnerability of these forces the application of
arbitrary geographic restrictions. 1 1
Exemption of this region by the superpowers in inconceivable.
A. THE BALTIC AS THE KEY
North Europeans realize the potential for Soviet control of
the Baltic, should Soviet nuclear forces not be included in the
proposed Nordic NWFZ. Pierre Schori, Secretary General of the
Swedish Foreign Affairs Ministry stated that "in line with the
Swedish position, the creation of a zone (nuclear-free) must, first
of all, provide for withdrawing from the Baltic Sea all submarines
with nuclear weapons.. .At the same time, the Swedish side never
insisted on automatically counting the strategic nuclear weapons
and systems in creating a nuclear-free zone."'1 9 9 The ban, by
Western interpretation, would include both American and Soviet
nuclear submarines.
Moscow is all too aware of the naval superiority of the United
States and NATO over the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact in the
1 9 8 Purver, p. 8.
19 9
"Sweden'sSchori Briefs Press on Security Issues" PM291627
IZVESTIYA 29 Jan 88, FBIS-SOV-88-019, 29 Jan 88, pp 31-32.
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Nordic region. The Kremlin regards as dangerous the "process of
equipping United States ships with sea based long-range cruise
missiles intended for hitting targets on the territory of the
Soviet Union and other Warsaw treaty countries."'2 0 0 Moscow is
concerned with increased naval and air force activities of the
United States and NATO in the Baltic, North, Norwegian and
Greenland Seas as well as an increase in the testing operations of
"suppressing" the Soviet Navy in the vicinity of Soviet ports in
the beginning stage of a possible conflict and the blockading of
Warsaw Pact naval forces in treir bases. There has been "...some
slight moverent in the Arctic",2 0 1 by the Soviets. The Kremlin
views the Baltic and the Northern Flank as a tie to its Polar
strategy. The Nordic region is seen as a door to the Arctic. The
Kremlin regards the United States as "going all out to realize its
concept of forward-based sea frontiers in its 'Polar strategy'.
This is why the USSR has proposed to discuss, first and foremost,
with the states in this (Nordic) region, military threat that has
been mounting there over a long period of time.",2 0 2 Perceived is a
NATO mastering of the Arctic region as well.
2 0 0
"News Conference Held on N. Europe Naval Proposals:
Uspenskiy on Security" LD221434 TASS 22 Jan 88, FBIS-SOV-88-015,
25 Jan 88, p. 8.
2 0 1Mackintosh, p. 60.
2 0 2
"Lebedev Interviewed on Northern Europe Limits" PM211921
Moscow News No 3, 17 Jan 88, FBIS-SOV-88-015, 25 Jan 88, p. 10.
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The Soviet Union would like to maintain the "nuclear free
status" of Northern Europe. The designation of the Baltic Sea and
its straits as a "closed sea" would greatly facilitate this
objective,
The Soviets have long sought to encourage consideration of
the Baltic as a 'closed sea,' from which the naval vessels of
outside powers would be excluded. A 'nuclear free' Baltic
could be seen as the first step toward this broader goal, but
Moscow must realize that concessions far greater than tht
eliminatio,-n cAf tze uld u.Lt-class submarines will beM5cessary
in order to interest Western States in this idea."
The Kremlin already thinks of the region as such, but seeks
recognition outside the Soviet Union, more particularly by the
littoral nations of the Baltic. "... the Baltic, which the Soviet
Union has for years tried to turn into a kind of closed sea, free
from the forces of other nations outside it."'2 0 4  There is no
United States nuclear presence in Iceland, Denmark and Norway. A
Nordic NWFZ would not affect any current United States nuclear
deployments unless there was a political "spillover" effect
involving Central Europe or other regions. Should such a proposal
be adopted under Soviet terms, gone would be the American nuclear
presence in Western Europe, fragmented would be the flexible
responsiveness of NATO and laid would be the foundation for Soviet
domination. The United States is considered an "outsider" and not
being a littoral nation of the Baltic, the Soviet Union contends,
2 0 3Purver, p. 31.
2 0 4Malcolm Mackintosh, "The Security Context: A Soviet View"
Britain and NATO's Northern Flank, Geoffrey Till, Ed., (London:
The Macmillan Press, Ltd., 1988, p. 60).
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the American military presence is not warranted. Removal of the
American nuclear forces from Western Europe would put the Kremlin
one step closer to designation of the Baltic as a "closed sea".
1. Inner Seas Strategy
"The Baltic is neither a 'sea of peace' nor a nuclear-free
zone, but both conceptions with the Soviet Union as guarantor, are
evidently, politically the first steps towards an alteration of the
status of the Baltic to be a closed, Soviet-dominated sea."
205
"The zones-of-peace concept, while contributing to
Gorbachev's multifaceted foreign policy efforts aimed at
projecting the image of the Soviet Union as the chief
architect of peace in the 1980s and 1990s, would also, if
agreed to by the West, virtually eliminate the U.S. Navy's
program of joint and combined exercises. By denying the
United States the opportunity to practice the operations
envisaged in the Maritime Strategy, the Soviet Union could
seriously impair Western capability to cciuct those
operations under difficult wartime conditions."
The operative words in this quote are "if agreed to by the West".
It is highly unlikely that the United States would agree to a
concept that would eliminate its program of joint exercises. The
United States and the Soviet Union have different views on the
subject of exercises,
S...limits on exercises while satisfactory for continental
powers like the Soviet Union, are clearly impractical for
historical seapowers like the United States, the United
Kingdom, France, or Japan.. .The Soviets believe they maintain
high readiness by not exercising their fleet at sea, but by
maintaining an alert status in port or at an anchorage.
Virtually all other navies maintaining readiness is
205 Ibid, p. 39.
20 6David Alan Rosenberg, "It is Hardly Possible to Imagine
Anything Worse": Soviet Thoughts on the Maritime Strategy", Naval
War ColleQe Review, Summer 1988, p. 101.
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accomplished by maximizing the amount of t they remain
underway at sea in an operational status."
These Soviet overtures are more than just propaganda and constitute
a serious response to the challenge laid down by the American
defense initiative of NATO. This type of response may be the most
significant commentary produced by the Kremlin on maritime
strategy. "No doubt the Soviet Union would like to have their
cake, and eat it too - by closing their seas but at the same time
preserving their access to other people's.,,208
Soviet desires to designate the Baltic as a "closed sea"
is another attempt to brand a region off limits to the West most
particularly the United States. No matter how the region is viewed
by the Kremlin, the United States will not be open to such a
designation. Official designation of the Baltic as a "closed sea"
represents the first step in the accomplishment of a Nordic NWFZ
initiative for the Soviets. It would set a dangerous precedent
with irreversible consequences for designation of other regions as
"off limit" zones throughout the world. Nordic regional security
implications under a Nordic NWFZ during wartime would cripple
defense of the North.
2 07 Tritten, p. 8.
2 0 8Mackintosh, p. 60.
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B. REPERCUSSIONS FOR THE NORTHERN FLANK IN A POTENTIAL NATO-
WARSAW PACT CONFRONTATION
Danish territory "...represents the northern flank of NATO's
central region. 2 09 The goals of the Warsaw Pact in a potential
military action are geared toward the ultimate control of the
region, initially through conventional weaponry. The Alliance's
vulnerable flanks would surely constitute prime focuses for Soviet
military planners. Norway, Iceland and the Baltic would be the
principal northern targets. Soviet objectives are not difficult
to identify. Protection of Soviet SSBN sanctuaries and launch
positions would be of major importance. Defense against United
States carrier and cruise missile strikes directed at the Kola
basing complex would follow. Warsaw Pact objectives would also be
seeking access to Norwegian airfields and harbors and or denial of
such to NATO, ensuring free movement to Soviet warships into
Atlantic waters, neutralization or seizure of Iceland and
interdiction of the SLOCs between North American and Western
Europe. Protection of Soviet SLOCs as well will play a role in
Soviet wartime contingencies. Despite Soviet advances in
communications, technology and logistics, the West can still
suppose certain problems still exist for the Warsaw Pact.
Prevention of NATO incursions into the Baltic Sea, control of
the Danish Straits and amphibious assaults against the Northern
Army Group (NORTHAG) sector of NATO's Central Front would be
2 09Taylor, Cole, p. xiv.
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objectives as well. To carry out its wartime strategy, Moscow
would rely upon on all its armed forces, including its navy. The
Northern Fleet is the most formidable of the four fleets. Jonathan
Alford contends that the Northern Fleet will be crucial to the
Soviets in its maritime strategy during a Warsaw Pact/NATO conflict
and where "the focus of attention shifts from the Baltic approaches
to the Far North."'2 1 0 He contends that "Who controls the Norwegian
Sea depends on who controls the North Norwegian airfield3; who
controls those airfields depends on who gets there first; and who
gets there first depends on who controls the Norwegian Sea."
2 1 1
The Soviet Union has the advantage of proximity and
"prepositioning" unmatched by the United States. United States and
Allied response is hampered by Norway's prepositioning
restrictions.
The importance of NATO controlling the Norwegian Sea as well
as Norway's coastal waters is evident. Once established in
northern Norway, Soviet military forces could more effectively
defend the Northern Fleet's bases. Ships, submarines and long-
range aircraft, Backfires and Blackjacks would be in a far better
position to interdict the sea lanes crossing the North Atlantic.
A follow-on Soviet drive southward from territory seized in the
North Cape would threaten a link-up with other Warsaw Pact combat
2 1 0jonathan Alford, "The Current Maritime Position in the
Northern Fleet" Marineblad (December 1986/January 1987), p. 604.
2 1 1 ibid"
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forces operating in the Baltic thus creating increased perils to
the Northern Flank of NATO's Central Front. The larger amphibious
forces available to the Pact in the Baltic region would be used
both to assault the northern area of the Central Front and to
attack Denmark as part of a campaign to seize control of the Danish
Straits. "Nearly half (12 of 27) of major Soviet amphibious ships
are assigned to the Baltic Fleet. They are augmented by about 40
East German and Polish amphibious ships of equal or only slightly
lesser capability.
'2 1 2
To accomplish its tasks,"the Baltic Fleet has been assigned
230 warships and 260 combat aircraft. '" 2 1 3 With the addition of
amphibious assets from East Germany and Poland, the capabilities
of the Western Theatre of Operations (TVD) are the most potent of
the Soviet fleets. As in the case with the Northern Fleet, the
Baltic's efforts would be complemented by elements from other
Soviet armed forces, particularly frontal aviation providing air
cover for naval bases and sea missions. Whether in the defense
against Soviet incursions on NATO's Northern Flank or neutralizing
gains made in the event they were successtul, Allied sea powar
especially carrier aircraft, cruise missiles and submarines would
be indispensable. Ironically, its is in these aspects of overall
2 12 Francis J. West, Jr., Jacquelyn K. Davis, James E.
Dougherty, Robert J. Hanks, Charles M. Perry, Naval Forces and
Western Security Special Report 1987, The Atlantic Alliance and
Western Security: The Maritime Dimension, Volume 1, p. 23.
2 1 31bid, p. 24.
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Alliance defense that a lack of appreciation for the potential
contribution of sea power is most apparent.
2 1 4
Problems of resupply plague NATO planners as well. It is in
this arena that NATO is at another disadvantage in defense of the
region. As Warsaw Pact marshals will be dependent upon the SLOCs,
so too will NATO admirals, but more so. The Warsaw Pact has the
advantage of closer proximity to its home bases. Even though NATO
allies will assist in the resupply effort, it is well-known that
NATO's pre-positioned reserves are inadequate. General Kroesen,
cites "shortage of ammunition",2 1 5 and remembers that when he came
to office he found,
"a terrible shortage in our (NATO) war reserve stocks... in
the major assemblies needed for maintaining tanks and trucks
and armored personnel carriers - transmissions, engines, final
drives etc. We (NATO) had stockpiles of 30, 40, or 60 days
of armunition or C rations, but we (NATO) had zero gs or one
or two days of stocks of those major assemblies."
The General cites "limitations on money and the lack of priority
for the procurement of those parts or assemblies for distribution
to war reservp stocks in Europe"'2 1 7 as the culpriL. Complicating
NATO's reinforcement/resupply dilemma is the inability to sustain
a protracted defense as a result of the imbalance in conventional
forces between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. General John R. Galvin,
USA, Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) substantiates this,
2 1 4 Ibid
.
2 1 5Roos, p. 65.
2 1 6 Ibid.
217ib - 9
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"At this moment I can guarantee only that we (NATO) can defend
ourselves for two weeks against an all-out Warsaw Pact attack
- then we will have to use nuclear weapons. Therefore 1athe
conventional capability of NATO must be reinforced...'
The Baltic and its Approaches are critical to deciding the outcome
in a potential NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict. NATO control of the
region would provide the West with a fair chance for victory in a
NATO/Warsaw Pact conflict otherwise such a conflict is lost for the
West. The shift in region of late has been in favor of the Warsaw
Pact with little indication of a reversal. Critical reevaluation
of Western strategy for the region is demanded.
Admiral Baggett, previously cited, stated:
"There is no reason to have maritime forces unless they
support the land strategy, where we live, and that takes
several forms - the reinforcement and resupply of Europe,
direct support of the northern flank, and protection of the
economic shipping of both North America and the European
Allies.. .to vir the land campaign iq, urope, we must win the
maritime campaign in the Atlantic." (Emphasis added)
But in order to win the maritime campaign in the Atlantic, NATO
must beat the Soviets. In order to defeat the Soviets, NATO must
seize control of the Central Front by seizing control of the Baltic
in the initial stage of a Warsaw Pact/NATO conflict. This would
assure control of the Northern Flank which in turn would yield the
decisive advantage to NATO.
"Lose the war quickly on the Central Front and there is no
long war to fight... perceptions of weakness on the flanks can
only encourage the Soviet Union to believe that they could
turn the centre (sic) if it did show signs of holding; and,
2 1 8 Henryan Loon, "An exclusive AFJI interview with: General
John R. Galvin, USA, Supreme Allied Commander Europe" Armed Forces
Journal International, March 1988, p. 50.
2 1 9 benjamin F. Schemmer, p. 69.
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second, the Atlantic Bridge must be kept open if NATO is not
to lose a longer war even if it were to withstand the first
shock...the Atlantic Alliance cannot choose what it will
defend. Forward de51se is not a guiding principle only for
the Central Front." (Emphasis added)
Forward defense is the key to the defense of Western Europe. In
terms of Western European security forward defense translates to
the American nuclear guarantee but the American Navy's maritime
strategy suggest otherwise. NATO can not afford to lose Denmark,
or any of the nations contiguous to the Central Front, as part of
its defensive framework. A Nordic NWFZ would not only eliminate
the nations of the Central Front, militarily and politically, frolu
the Alliance but it would eliminate the American nuclear guarantee
and as such, the flexible response of NATO. "Sovie. political and
military leaders have long felt that war is an acceptable risk only
if NATO's nuclear options in the European theatre are eliminated.
Consequently, it is no coincidence that the vision of a future
world without nuclear weapons translates into the practical demand
that the Western Alliance renounce the strategy of 'flexible
response' ,,221
2 2 0 Ibid
.
221A.I. Gribkov in Krasnaya zvezda, September 25, 1987, as
quoted by Gerhard Wettig in "Has Soviet Military Doctrine Changed?"
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, November 20, 1987, p. 4.
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IX. CONCLUSION
The Nordic NWFZ proposal is a symbolic arms control maneuver
at best. The concept is doomed, for no matter how persistent
Moscow is about the establishment of such a zone, the United States
still remains opposed to the idea. It is doubtful that the
discussion will advance past the debate stage. Each Scandinavian
nation seeks autonomy within the zone and none of these nations is
willing to acquiesce to another, particularly a superpower. As
stated earlier, the Nordic leaders will not allow Scandinavia to
be used as a superpower pawn. Definition of a Nordic NWFZ that is
acceptable to all concerned nations has not been reached.
Furthermore "in no case have NWFZs managed to gain support of all
the states of a region or all of the eligible external powers.
'2 2 2
The Nordic NWFZ does not contradict this statement.
However, the debating process itself can be useful by
fostering a greater awareness in the hopes of reducing tension
regarding nuclear warfare in the North,
"...the mere process of working toward the creation of a
Nordic NFZ can be as important as the eventual establishment
of the zone itself. Even if the goal of a nuclear-free in
northern Europe is never realized, many beleive that the zone
concept will have served its purpose if the process of
exploration and negotiation encourages increased Nordic
2 2 2Purver, p. 12.
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cooperation and 2 irther promotes the stability and low tension
of the region."
This is the only success that the zone may achieve but the Nordic
NWFZ debate will continue. The Soviets use the debate as a tool
of political detente to enhance Soviet military detente. It is
forecasted that Moscow will become more adamant in the near future
regarding establishment of a Nordic NWFZ. Recent events in Eastern
Europe, more particularly in the Baltic Republics provide the
necessary impetus. Moscow will not and cannot afford the alignment
of any of its Baltic republics with the West or Western allies.
Such an alignment would diminish the likelihood of a Soviet-defined
Nordic NWFZ. The United States must stand firm in its opposition
to a Nordic NWFZ. A Nordic NWFZ is not in the interest of Western
security.
A. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR US POLICY
The United States maintains a political edge over the Soviet
Union in the North Atlantic. Should the United States be limited
in its nuclear weaponry by a Nordic NWFZ then this political edge
would be diminished. "The main significance of nuclear weapons is
political: they impose terror on the opposing government." 224 When
interpreting the Soviet proposals for a Nordic NWFZ one should
remember that "Moscow was historically first and foremost a land
22 3Richard A. Bitzinger, "Competing Security Doctrines And A
Nordic Nuclear-Free Zone" P-7502, November 1988, p. 22.
224Norman Friedman, "Towards A New U.S. Strategy (Part I)"
Defense Science, February 1989, p. 22.
102
power. Naval, and later air, capabilities were developed to
complement that power and to integrate with it, not to challenge
or supplant it."'2 2 5  The Soviet Union still has "the relative
advantage of landpower over seapower... (a) seapower (which) is
ultimately dependent upon an adequate landbase. '" 2 2 6 The Soviet
Union wants to maintain this relative advantage. To do so, the
American naval presence in the North Atlantic must be reduced. The
American naval nuclear guarantee must be circumvented and a NWFZ
in the Nordic region would greatly enhance the Soviet Union's
chances in the attainment of such a goal.
Historically, the Soviet Union has associated survival of the
state with the stability and subordination of peripheral actors.
The Soviets are highly reactive to displays of instability and
disloyalty along their border. A Nordic NWFZ not consistent with
the Soviet proposal could be perceived by Moscow as disruptive.
Sharing a common border, the Nordic region is clearly a product of
vital Soviet border concerns and interest. The North's
geographical proximity plays a critical role. The Soviets do not
view the region as a unified whole. ". ..the question of what one
could call the 'vicinity' of countries, of being nearby, is very
important. In fact it is in some ways more important now than it
was in the past because, not just for reasons of strategy but also
2 2 5 C.G. Jacobsen, "Soviet strategy, the naval dimension"
International Defense Review, 10/1986, p. 1431.
2 2 6 Francis P. Sempa, "Geopolitics And American Strategy: A
Reassessment" Stratecgic Review, Spring 1987, p. 29.
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for reasons of ideology, to have an ideologically distinct and a
hostile, even small, country on your frontier is not something the
great powers like."
2 2 7
Scandinavia is not hostile to the Soviet Union but as long as
it remains a part of NATO the likelihood of it becoming so in a
NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict exists.
Former Secretary of State Shultz stated,
"I find it difficult to believe that our (US) relations with
the Soviet Union will ever be 'normal' in the sense that we
(US) have normal relations with most other countries. There
are only two superpowers in the world. We are vastly
different in the ways we view the role of the individual in
our societies, and in the ways we relate to other countries.
The relationship between us will always be unique. It seems
unlikely that the US-Soviet relationship will ever lose what
always has been and H8 today a strongly wary and at times
adversarial element." (Emphasis added)
This is and should remain the motivation for the Alliance and all
of its members. Also sought is reduction of tension between the
two superpowers. NATO is not an aggressive alliance but a
defensive alliance designed to protect its gains in time of war.
Security can only be achieved in conjunction with one's opponent.
Little analysis has been given to political regimes of the North
that would result from the establishment of a Nordic NWFZ. By
leaving out politics, one is ignoring the true sources of conflict
and instability. It is not the nuclear weaponry but the politics
2 2 7 Fred Halliday, James Sherr, ed. Soviet Power: The
Continuing Challenge, p. 199.
2 2 8 Shultz, p. 325.
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surrounding the weaponry that is the heart of the nuclear free zone
debate.
Only through the establishment of a Nordic NWFZ beneficial to
NATO, Scandinavia and the United States can such a zone be
envisioned. Restored would be deterrence through the credibility
of nuclear threats and safeguarded would be the flexible response
of NATO. "The issue of Soviet-American relations is in essence a
test of the overall worth of the United States as a nation among
nations. To avoid destruction the United States need only measure
up to its own best traditions and prove itself worthy of
preservation as a great nation.,,229
Norman Friedman in part two of his series, "Towards A New U.S.
Strategy" addresses the need for the United States to think past
containment of the Soviet Union. He states that,
"Current policy is schizophrenic. The national strategy is
still Containment, but little has been done to connect
Containment to actual military requirements. Nor has much
been done to ask whether Containment still answers all, or
most, of the requirements of current U.S. strategy. In
particular, the Soviets are clearly currently the only major
threat, but how long is that likely to ytinue to be the
case? Forever? For two to three decades?"
The world is no longer the bipolar world resulting from World War
II. It is a multi-polar world whose players may or may not have
nuclear weapons and whose national security objectives may or may
not coincide with those of the United States. Unfortunately, the
229"X,1 "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign Affairs
Spring 1987, p. 868.
2 3 0 Norman Friedman, "Towards A New U.S. Strategy (Part II),"
Defense Science, March 1989, p. 50.
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United States has a pattern of "action-inaction" behavior (Soviets
= action and United States = inaction) whose emphasis is upon the
Soviet Union when dealing with threats to its national security.
Not only the United States but the West suffers from this flaw.
Allies such as the Japanese have labeled this as "wobbling" and
caution the West. "We (Japanese) are most apprehensive if there
occurs wobbling within the West each time General Secretary makes
a peace offensive."'2 3 1  The United States cannot afford the
reputation of a wobbler. Changing world politics demand that the
West develop a unified strategy toward the Soviet Union and its
initiatives.
The Soviets were willing to negotiate only when in a strong
military position to do so even though current Soviet arms control
initiatives may suggest otherwise. Such a strength can only be
assessed by the Soviets. Should war aims expand and the Soviets
not desire to avoid an admission of weakness, the willingness to
negotiate will greatly been diminished. The role of the Soviet
leader is intricately intertwined in this philosophy. No longer
can policies of the Soviet Union and its leaders be predicted.
Pragmatic, reasonable solutions as defined by the Kremlin are
stressed. The Soviet Union is still willing to intervene in an
area wherever it feels threatened yet it is also willing to
withdraw from an area if it is advantageous to do so politically.
2 3 1
"Japan Announces New Defense Spending Policy" Foreign
Broadcast Information Services, 27 Jan 87, 0W241329 Tokyo Kyodo in
English 1313 GMT 24 Jan 87, p. C-I.
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The Soviet Union will do whatever is necessary to further its
objectives whether a proven success or not, even if it appears to
border on 'Westernization'.
Rejuvenated Soviet leadership had proven that "no American
president can base his policies for dealing with the USSR on the
presumed intentions of a Soviet general secretary. We cannot
predict whether his intentions may radically change under political
pressure.'"2 32 World relations, most particularly past negotiating
initiatives of the United States, when dealing with the Soviet
Union, require careful evaluation and consideration and can only
provide historical guidance versus a forecast.
As Vice Admiral Charles R. Larson, U.S. Navy, now Commander
in Chief Pacific Fleet states,
"Once a mutually agreed upon arms control regime for land
forces has been established that enhances stability in Europe,
then the Western allies can examine the possibility of
limitations on naval forces2 they would affect the European
balance of military power."
This is not only true of arms control agreements in general but
regional arms control limitations such as the Nordic NWFZ. Needed
is a more consistent policy that does not leave the American nation
vulnerable to the demands of other nations.
2 32HenryKissinger and Cyrus Vance, "Bipartisan Objectives for
Foreign Policy" Foreign Affairs (Summer 1988) p. 903.
2 33ViceAdmiral Charles R. Larson, U.S. Navy, Deputy Chief of
Naval Operations (Plans, Policy and Operations) in a statement
before the Seapower Subcommittee of the House Armed Services
Committee on Naval Arms Control, April, 1989, p. 6.
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The Soviets are masters of their own fate and as such their
own foreign policy. As cited earlier, "the Soviet Union is not a
status quo power - and cannot be so according to its own image of
itself. For the ruling class of the nomenklatura international
politics as all other politics, consists of a perpetual
struggle." 2 3 4 Regardless of the depth of Western analysis, it still
fails to provide the definitive key to Soviet ideological or
foreign policy objectives. Yet should pragmatism fail for the
Soviets they are above to resorting to some of their old tricks.
Soviets display a 'Potemkin-like' manner in dealing with
foreignes. This same trait is found in dealii,, wich the United
States in the resolution of arms control issues. "Facade-building"
is a frequent characteristic of Soviet negotiations. "New
Thinking" would exempt the Nordic NWFZ proposal from this pattern.
The West has yet to see proof of this.
The Soviet Union is the inferior superpower, politically and
economically and it understands this all too well. Moscow has
reverted back to its policy of 'Potemkinism' or facade building
via deception. Hedrick Smith in his book, The Russians relays a
conversation in which a Soviet government consultant explains the
'Potemkinism' of the Soviets:
"We do it naturally,.. .It is to our advantage. Deceit is a
compensation of inferiority between foreigners. As a nation,
we can not deal with others equally. Either we are more
powerful or they are. And if they are, and we feel it, we
2 3 4 BentJensen, "The Soviet Union And Scandinavia: Status Quo
Or Revision - 'Nordic Balance' Or "Nordic Peace Zone'?" Nordic
Journal of Scandinavian Affairs, Volume 4:1 (1987), p. 9.
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compensate by deceiving them. It is a very iortant
feature of our (Soviet) national character."
This is an excellent summarization of Soviet objective not only in
arms control issues such, as the Nordic NWFZ, but in Soviet foreign
policy, generally. Realizing it is operating from a level of
inferiority and therefore at a disadvantage, the Kremlin has opted
for the proven avenue of deceit. Moscow is giving the impression
of force reductions in Europe and conforming to Western wishes of
arms control. The bottom line remains, only the Kremlin knows what
Soviets intentions are. One is reminded of the old adage of having
your cake and eating it too. If the Soviets can convince the
United States and Scandinavia of its "sincerity" in the arena of
nuclear arms control, with minimal sacrifice, it has accomplished
its objective. ". ..as NATO remains a defensive alliance that which
we (the United States) perceive as a reality matters not so much
as what the Soviets believe."'2 3 6  No matter how NATO and its
members perceive the Alliance, its defense is measured in the
Soviet perception of the Alliance. The same applies for the Nordic
NWFZ. The Nordic NWFZ is a concept that must incorporate political
and military ramifications.
The United States must ensure that the Nordic nations
collectively oppose the Nordic NWFZ. The two neutral states of
Finland and Sweden remain vulnerable. Their close proximity to
2 3 5 Hedrick Smith, The Russians, p. 21.
2 3 6 Phillip A. Petersen, "Iceland in Soviet Military
Strategy", p. 8.
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the Soviet Union will make them critical counterweights for either
superpower in the Nordic NWFZ debate. The United States through
NATO must preserve its vital economic, political and military
objectives in the Northern Flank. Flexible naval forces and strong
political and economic ties to the governments of the nations
bordering on the Baltic are essential. Strong NATO naval forces
operating in the waters of the Baltic must be seen as guarantors
of the West's strategic aims and interests. A Nordic NWFZ would
prevent this-
Moscow will continue to use the Nordic NWFZ debate as a
political tool for the enhancement of Soviet military detente.
It is forecasted that Moscow will become more adamant in the near
future regarding adoption of a Nordic NWFZ in light of current
events in Eastern Europe, the bid for German reunification and the
cry for independence in the Baltic Republics. The Soviet Union
will not willingly tolerate additional demccratic nations so close
to its border, particularly those that favor the West, to be non-
aligned nuclearly with either camp or aligned nuclearly with the
West. A Nordic NWFZ is not in the best interest of US national
security. Adoption of such a zone would abolish the American
nuclear security guarantee for the North.
Politics not the geographic designation the define an area as
a Nuclear Free Zone (NFZ). As previously stated, it is the
politics that is at the heart of the Nordic NWFZ debate.
Recognition of a Nordic NWFZ must be by all nations, external as
well as internal otherwise a Nordic NWFZ is meaningless. If Soviet
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Union is not willing to relinquish its "nuclear hold" of the North,
the viability of the zone is eliminated. Subsequent ramifications
for regional security cannot be overlooked.
Consideration also must be made for those nations which border
the zone but are not part of the zone for their security is
intrinsically tied to the Nordic NWFZ. Sanctions against the
possible use, storage or transit of nuclear weapons through their
territories must be broached. The Nordic iWFZ debate is multi-
faceted and to expect that all nations affected by the zone can
reach a unilateral agreement is ambitious at best.
The Nordic nations are taking a more active role in their own
politics and as such are developing a much more sophisticated view
of their strategic significance to Western security. The Nordic
proposal as it stands will not win acceptance by Scandinavia. A
Nordic NWFZ is a step back for Western security rather than a step
forward. Infringement upon the national security of a region by
a geographic "stand off zone" such as the Nordic NWFZ contradicts
Western security objectives. A Nordic NWFZ is an inequitable
concept that only perpetuates the "Zero-Sum Gain" mentality.
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